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ABSTRACT
Over the last two centuries, the impact of the Human System has grown dramatically, becoming strongly
dominant within the Earth System in many different ways. Consumption, inequality, and population have
increased extremely fast, especially since about 1950, threatening to overwhelm the many critical functions
and ecosystems of the Earth System. Changes in the Earth System, in turn, have important feedback effects
on the Human System, with costly and potentially serious consequences. However, current models do not
incorporate these critical feedbacks. We argue that in order to understand the dynamics of either system,
Earth SystemModels must be coupled with Human SystemModels through bidirectional couplings
representing the positive, negative, and delayed feedbacks that exist in the real systems. In particular, key
Human System variables, such as demographics, inequality, economic growth, and migration, are not
coupled with the Earth System but are instead driven by exogenous estimates, such as United Nations
population projections.This makes current models likely to miss important feedbacks in the real
Earth–Human system, especially those that may result in unexpected or counterintuitive outcomes, and
thus requiring different policy interventions from current models.The importance and imminence of
sustainability challenges, the dominant role of the Human System in the Earth System, and the essential
roles the Earth System plays for the Human System, all call for collaboration of natural scientists, social
scientists, and engineers in multidisciplinary research and modeling to develop coupled Earth–Human
systemmodels for devising effective science-based policies and measures to benefit current and future
generations.
Keywords: Earth and Human SystemModels, population, migration, inequality, data assimilation,
bidirectional couplings and feedbacks, sustainability
SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT
TheHuman System has become strongly dominant
within the Earth System in many different ways.
However, in current models that explore the fu-
ture of humanity and environment, and guide policy,
key Human System variables, such as demograph-
ics, inequality, economic growth, and migration, are
not coupled with the Earth System but are instead
driven by exogenous estimates such as United Na-
tions (UN) population projections. This makes the
models likely tomiss important feedbacks in the real
Earth–Human system that may result in unexpected
outcomes requiring very different policy interven-
tions. The importance of humanity’s sustainabil-
ity challenges calls for collaboration of natural and
C©TheAuthor(s) 2016. Published byOxfordUniversity Press on behalf of China Science Publishing&Media Ltd.This is anOpen Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
work is properly cited.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/nsr/article-abstract/3/4/470/2669331 by U
niversity of N
ew
castle user on 11 Septem
ber 2018
REVIEW Motesharrei et al. 471
social scientists to develop coupled Earth–Human
system models for devising effective science-based
policies and measures.
HIGHLIGHTS
(1)The Human System has become strongly domi-
nantwithin theEarth System inmanydifferentways.
(a) Consumption, inequality, and population
have increased extremely fast, especially since
∼1950.
(b)Thecollective impact of these changes threat-
ens to overwhelm the viability of natural systems and
the many critical functions that the Earth System
provides.
(2) Changes in the Earth System, in turn, have im-
portant feedback effects on theHuman System, with
costly and serious consequences.
(3)However, currentmodels, such as the Integrated
Assessment Models (IAMs), that explore the future
of humanity and environment, and guide policy, do
not incorporate these critical feedbacks.
(a) Key Human System variables, such as demo-
graphics, inequality, economic growth, and migra-
tion, are instead driven by exogenous projections,
such as the UN population tables.
(b) Furthermore, such projections are shown to
be unreliable.
(4) Unless models incorporate such two-way cou-
plings, they are likely to miss important dynamics
in the real Earth–Human system that may result in
unexpected outcomes requiring very different policy
interventions.
(5) Therefore, Earth System Models (ESMs) must
be bidirectionally coupled with Human System
Models.
(a) Critical challenges to sustainability call
for a strong collaboration of both earth and
social scientists to develop coupled Earth–Human
System models for devising effective science-based
policies and measures.
(b)We suggest usingDynamicModeling, Input–
Output (IO)models, andDataAssimilation to build
and calibrate such coupled models.
DESCRIPTION OF SECTIONS
The First Section, entitled ‘Dominance of the Hu-
man Systemwithin the Earth System’, describesma-
jor changes in the relationship between the Earth
Systemand theHumanSystem, andkeyHumanSys-
tem factors driving these changes.
The Second Section, entitled ‘Inequality, con-
sumption, demographics, andother keyHumanSys-
tem properties: projections vs. bidirectional cou-
pling’, provides examples of fundamental problems
in the exogenous projections of key Human System
factors used in current models.
The Third Section, entitled ‘Human System
threatens to overwhelm the Carrying Capacity and
ecosystem services of Earth System’, describes ex-
amples of changes in the Earth System that may im-
pact the Human System seriously, as well as missing
feedbacks from the Earth System onto the Human
System.
The Fourth Section, entitled ‘Bidirectional cou-
pling of Human System and Earth System Models
is needed. Proposed methodology: Dynamic Mod-
eling, Input–Output models, Data Assimilation’, ar-
gues for the need to bidirectionally couple both sys-
tems in order to model the future of either system
more realistically, andproposes practicalmethods to
implement this coupling.
DOMINANCE OF THE HUMAN SYSTEM
WITHIN THE EARTH SYSTEM
Humans impact the Earth System by extracting re-
sources and returningwaste and pollution to the sys-
tem, and simultaneously altering land cover, frag-
menting ecosystems, and reducing biodiversity.1
The level of this impact is determined by extrac-
tion and pollution rates, which in turn, are deter-
mined by the total consumption rate. Total con-
sumption equals population multiplied by average
consumption per capita, both of which are recog-
nized as primary drivers of human environmental
impact.2
1 Planet Earth has been the habitat of humans for hundreds of thousands
of years. Human life depends on the resources provided by the Earth
System: air from the Earth’s atmosphere; water from the atmosphere
and rivers, lakes, and aquifers; fruits from trees;meat and other products
from animals; and over the past 10,000 years, land for agriculture, and
metals and other minerals from the Earth’s crust. Until about 200 years
ago, we used renewable biomass as the major source of materials and
energy, but over the course of the past two centuries, we have instead
become heavily dependent on fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas)
and other minerals for both materials and energy. These nonrenewable
resources made possible both of the revolutions which drove the the
growth in consumption per capita and population: the Industrial Rev-
olution and the Green Revolution. Our relationship with our planet is
not limited to consuming its resources. Waste is an inevitable outcome
of any production process; what is produced must return to the Earth
System in some form.Wastewater goes back to the streams, rivers, lakes,
oceans, or into the ground; greenhouse and toxic gases go into the atmo-
sphere, land, and oceans; and trash goes into landfills and almost every-
where else.
2 Using gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as a rough measure of
consumption per capita, the extent of the impact of the Human System
on the Earth System can be estimated from the total population and the
average consumption per capita.This can be also seen from the defining
equation for GDP per capita, i.e., GDP per capita = GDP/Population.
Onemay rewrite this equation asGDP=Population×GDPper capita.
By taking variations, we get:
δGDP
GDP =
δPopulation
Population +
δGDP per capita
GDP per capita
This equation simply means that the relative change in the total GDP is
comprised of two components, i.e., the relative changes in population
and GDP per capita. A graphical demonstration of this decomposition
can be seen in the inset of Fig. 1. Data from [229], with updates from the
MaddisonProject, 2013(for theunderlyingmethodologyof theupdates
see [228]). Population data for the inset from [230].
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Population and GDP per capita (in the main graph) from 
year 1 to 2010 AD. The total human impact is their product.
Inset: Annual Growth of Total Consumption (Total GDP)
from 1950 to 2010 as the sum of contributions from
Population Growth and GDP per capita Growth.
Figure 1.World population and GDP per capita from year 1 to 2010 AD. The total human impact is their product. The inset
shows the relative annual change of each between 1950 and 2010 [228–230]. Their averages were 1.69% and 2.21%, respec-
tively, out of a total of ∼4% (average annual change in GDP). Therefore, growth in population and consumption per capita
have both played comparably important roles in the remarkable increase of human impact on planet Earth. This ∼4% total
growth corresponds to doubling the total impact every ∼17 years. Note that the contribution from population growth has
been relatively steady, while the contribution from the relative change in GDP per capita has been much more variable from
year to year (even negative for some years). See Footnote 2 for a description of the mathematical formula used to generate
the inset and sources of data.
The rapid expansion of the Human System has
been a remarkably recent phenomenon (see Fig. 1).
For over 90% of human existence, world popula-
tion remained less than 5 million. After the Agri-
cultural Revolution, it still took ∼10,000 years to
reach 1 billion, around the year 1800. About a cen-
tury later, the second billion was reached, around
1930. Thereafter, in less than a century, 5 billion
more humans were added (within a single human
lifetime). The peak in the rate of growth occurred
in the 1960s, but because of the larger total pop-
ulation, the peak in absolute growth has persisted
since the early 1990s [1]. To go from 5 to 6 bil-
lion took ∼12 years (1987–1999), and from 6 to 7
billion also took ∼12 years (1999–2011). The de-
cline in the rate of growth over the past few decades
has not significantly reduced the absolute number
currently added every year, ∼80 million (e.g., 83
million in 2016), equivalent to the population of
Germany [2,3].
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A similar pattern holds for GDP per capita, but
with the acceleration of growth occurring evenmore
recently (see Fig. 1) and with the distribution of
consumption becoming much more unequal. Thus,
until the last century, population andGDPper capita
were low enough that the Human System remained
a relatively small component of the Earth System.
However, both population and GDP per capita ex-
perienced explosive growth, especially after∼1950,
and the product of these two growths—total human
impact—has grown from relatively small to domi-
nant in the Earth System.
Contrary to popular belief, these trends still con-
tinue for both population and consumption per
capita. The world is projected to add a billion peo-
ple every 13–15 years for decades to come.The cur-
rent UN medium estimate expects 11.2 billion peo-
ple by 2100, while the high estimate is 16.6 billion.3
Similarly, while the highest rates of growth of global
per capita GDP took place in the 1960s, they are not
projected to decline significantly from their current
rates (so that estimates of annual global growth until
2040 range from 3.3% (IMF and IEA) to 3.8% (US
EIA), implying a doubling time of∼20 years).4
Two major factors enabled this demographic ex-
plosion. First, advances in public health, sanitation,
and medicine significantly reduced mortality rates
and lengthened average lifespan. Second, the rapid
and large-scale exploitationof fossil fuels [4]—avast
stock of nonrenewable resources accumulated by
Nature over hundreds of millions of years that are
being drawn down in just a few centuries—and the
invention of theHaber–Bosch process to use natural
gas to produce nitrogen fertilizer [5,6] enabled in-
creasingly higher levels of food and energy produc-
tion. All these factors allowed for this fast growth of
the Human System [7,8].5
Technological advances also allowed for the
rapid increase in consumption per capita (see
Fig. 1). This increase was made possible by a
dramatic expansion in the scale of resource extrac-
3 In fact, the UN’s 2015 Population Revision has already raised the global
total in 2100 by 360 million to 11.2 billion just from the last estimate
published in 2013 [1].
4 While there has been some reduction of the energy intensity and emis-
sions intensity of economic growth in wealthy countries, one has to be
cautious about extrapolating recent improvements, as small as theymay
be, because these improvements have been at least partly due to the out-
sourcing of energy-intensive sectors to poorer countries [122–130,231–
233], and because there are basic physical limits to further efficiency im-
provements, especially in the use of water, energy, food, and other natu-
ral resources [113,114,234–236].
5 For example, between 1950 and 1984, the production of grains in-
creased by 250% due to the use of fossil fuels for fertilization, mecha-
nization, irrigation, herbicides, and pesticides [237]. These technologi-
cal advances, together with the development of new seed varieties, are
referred to as the ‘Green Revolution’ that allowed global population to
double in that period [238].
tion, which, by providing a very large increase in
the use of inputs, greatly increased production, con-
sumption, throughput, and waste. During the fos-
sil fuel era, per capita global primary energy and
per capita global materials consumption have sig-
nificantly increased over time. Despite tremendous
advances in technological efficiencies, world energy
use has increased for coal, oil, gas, and electricity
since 1900, and global fossil fuel use per capita has
continued to rise over the last few decades. There
is no empirical evidence of reduction in use per
capita, nor has there been an abandonment or long-
term decline of one category through substitution
by another. The same applies to global per capita
use of materials for each of the major materials cate-
gories ofminerals—industrial, construction,materi-
als for ores, and materials derived from fossil energy
carriers.6
The rapidly growing size and influence of theHu-
man System has come to dominate the Earth Sys-
tem in many different ways [9–12]. Estimates of the
global net primary production (of vegetation) ap-
propriated by humans range as high as 55%, and the
percentage impacted, not just appropriated, is much
larger [13–23]. Human activity has also had a net
negative effect on total global photosynthetic pro-
ductivity since the most productive areas of land are
directly in the path of urban sprawl [24]. Human
use of biomass for food, feed, fiber, fuel, and mate-
rials has become a primary component of global bio-
geochemical cycles of carbon, nitrogen, phospho-
rous, and other nutrients. Land use for biomass pro-
duction is one of the most important stressors on
biodiversity, while total biomass use has continued
to grow and demand is expected to continue grow-
ing over the next few decades [25]. Global food de-
mand alone has been projected to double or more
from 2000 to 2050 due to both rising population
and rising incomes [26]. Most agriculturally usable
land has already been converted to agriculture [27].
Most large mammals are now domesticated ani-
mals [28,29]. Soils worldwide are being eroded, fish-
eries exhausted, forests denuded, and aquifers drawn
down, while desertification due to overgrazing, de-
forestation, and soil erosion is spreading [30–33].
Deforestation, in turn, affects local climate through
evapotranspiration and albedo [34,35]. Since cli-
mate change is expected tomake subtropical regions
drier, desertification is expected to further increase,
6 Thus, while the rate of materials intensity of GDP growth has declined
(very slowly: 2.5 kg/$ in 1950, 1.4 kg/$ in 2010), the per capita rate
continues to increase. The only materials category whose per capita use
has remained relatively stable is biomass [4,132], probably reflecting the
physical limits of the planet’s regenerating natural resources to continue
to provide humans with ever-growing quantities of biomass [239,240].
(See [134] for a conceptual model of regenerating natural resources.)
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especially due to bidirectional albedo–vegetation
feedback [22].
At the same time, greenhouse gases (GHGs)
from fossil fuels, together with land-use change,
have become the major drivers of global climate
change [10,36,37]. Atmospheric levels of carbon
dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide not only ex-
ceed pre-industrial concentrations by∼40%, 150%,
and 20%, respectively, they are now substantially
above their maximum ranges of fluctuation over the
past 800,000 years7 [36] while total carbon diox-
ide emissions continue to grow at a rapid rate [38].
Arctic sea ice, Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets,
global glacier mass, permafrost area, and Northern
Hemisphere snow cover are all decreasing substan-
tially, while ocean surface temperatures, sea level,
and ocean acidification are rising [36]. Arctic sea ice
is decreasing at an average rate of 3.0 ± 0.3 m2 per
metric tonofCO2 emissions and at the current emis-
sions rate of 35 gigaton per year could completely
disappear by 2050 during Septembers [39].The rate
of ocean acidification, in particular, is currently esti-
mated to be at least 100 times faster than at any other
time in the last 20 million years [12].
The Human System dominates the global nitro-
gen cycle, having produced a 20% rise in nitrous ox-
ide (N2O) in the atmosphere, now the third largest
contributor to global warming, and a tripling of am-
monia (NH3) in the atmosphere due to human
activities [40]. In total, human processes produce
more reactive nitrogen than all natural processes
combined [12,41–45], altering the global nitrogen
cycle so fundamentally that Canfield et al. [41] es-
timate the closest geological comparison occurred
∼2.5billionyears ago.Nitrogenandphosphorus fer-
tilizer runoff, along with nitrogen oxides from fossil-
fuel combustion (which is then deposited by rain
over land and water) are causing widespread eu-
trophication in rivers, lakes, estuaries, and coastal
oceans, and creating massive Dead Zones with lit-
tle or no oxygen, which are increasing in number
and size in coastal waters and oceans globally, killing
large swaths of sea life and damaging or destroying
fisheries. This may be compounded further by po-
tentially dangerous positive feedbacks between hy-
poxia, ocean acidification, and rising sea tempera-
tures [12,41,46–52].
Human activities also dominate many regional
hydrological cycles [53–60], with more than half of
all accessible surface freshwater being used by hu-
mans, to such an extent that some major rivers are
being so excessively depleted that they sometimes
no longer reach the sea, while some major inland
fresh and saltywater bodies, such asLakeChad,Lake
7 In some estimates, as much as 10–15 million years for carbon [241].
Urmia, Lake Poopo´, and Aral Sea, are drying up.
In many of the principal aquifers that support the
world’s agricultural regions and in most of the ma-
jor aquifers in the world’s arid and semi-arid zones,
groundwater extraction is occurring at far greater
rates than natural recharge.This includes aquifers in
the US High Plains and Central Valley, the North
China Plain, Australia’s Canning Basin, the North-
west Sahara Aquifer System, the Guarani Aquifer
in South America, and the aquifers beneath much
of the Middle East and northwestern India [61–
68]. Climate change can increase the frequency and
severity of extreme weather events, such as hot and
cold temperature extremes, heat waves, droughts,
heavy precipitation, tropical cyclones, and storms
[69–74]. In addition, more impervious surfaces to-
gether with other land cover changes increase runoff
significantly, hence intensifying the adverse impacts
of extreme hydrological events [75–77].
Many other socioeconomic trends and their im-
pacts on the Earth System have accelerated syn-
chronously since the 1950s with little sign of abate-
ment [78,79]. For example, human processes play
a major role in virtually every major metal cycle,
leading to atmospheric and direct contamination of
terrestrial and aquatic environments by trace-metal
pollutants. Coal combustion is the major source of
atmospheric Cr, Hg, Mn, Sb, Se, Sn, and Tl emis-
sions, oil combustion of Ni and V, and gasoline
combustion of Pb, while nonferrous metal produc-
tion is the largest source of As, Cd, Cu, In, and
Zn [80]. Surface mining has also become a dom-
inant driver of land-use change and water pollu-
tion in certain regions of the world, where moun-
taintop removal, coal and tar sands exploitation,
and other open pit mining methods strip land sur-
faces of forests and topsoils, produce vast quan-
tities of toxic sludge and solid waste, and often
fill valleys, rivers, and streams with the resulting
waste and debris [81]. All of these trends can have
an impact on other species, and while the exact
causes are difficult to establish, current animal and
plant species extinction rates are estimated to be at
least 100 times the natural background rate [33,82–
84]. Furthermore, ecosystems worldwide are ex-
periencing escalating degradation and fragmenta-
tion, altering their health and provision of important
ecosystem functions and services for humans and
other species.8
8 Rates of deforestation and agricultural expansion have accelerated
in recent years with extensive new infrastructure providing con-
duits for settlement, exploitation, and development. Even within the
remaining habitat, fragmentation is causing rapid species loss or alter-
ation, and is producing major impacts on biodiversity, regional hydrol-
ogy, and global climate, in particular in tropical forests, which con-
tain over half of Earth’s biodiversity and are an important driver in the
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Thus, the Human System has fundamentally im-
pacted the Earth System in a multitude of ways. But
as we will show, these impacts on the Earth Sys-
tem also feed back onto theHuman System through
various factors and variables: human health, fertil-
ity, well-being, population, consumption, economic
growth, development, migration, and even produc-
ing societal conflict. Rather than incorporating these
feedbacks, current models simply use independent
projections of these Human System variables, often
in a highly unreliable way.
INEQUALITY, CONSUMPTION,
DEMOGRAPHICS, AND OTHER KEY
HUMAN SYSTEM PROPERTIES:
PROJECTIONS VS. BIDIRECTIONAL
COUPLING
These large human impacts on the Earth System
must be considered within the context of the large
global economic inequality to realize that current
levels of resource extraction and throughput only
support societies at First World living standards for
∼17% of the world’s current population [1]. The
majority of the world’s people live at what would
be considered desperate poverty levels in developed
countries, the average per capita material and en-
ergy use in developed countries is higher than in
developing countries by a factor of 5 to 10 [25],
and the developed countries are responsible for over
three quarters of cumulative greenhouse gas emis-
sions from 1850 to 2000 [85]. To place global
resource-use inequality into perspective, it would re-
quire global resource use and waste production at
least 2 to 5 times higher than it is now to bring
the average levels of the ∼83% of the world’s peo-
ple living in developing countries up to the aver-
age levels of developed countries today [25]. The
near-tripling in CO2 emissions per capita in China
from just 1990 to 2010 demonstrates the similar po-
tential increases that could take place in the less de-
veloped world if this economic disparity is reduced
[86]. Despite making China a focus of global con-
cern because it became the single largest energy user
and carbon emitter, China’s 2010 per capita energy
use (1.85metric tons of oil equivalent, toe)was actu-
climate system. Ongoing worldwide habitat fragmentation, together
with anthropogenic climate change and other human pressures, may
severely degrade or destroy any remaining ecosystems and their wildlife
[242–251]. For example, the Living Planet Index, which measures bio-
diversity based on 14,151 monitored populations of 3,706 vertebrate
species, shows a staggering 58% decline in populations monitored be-
tween 1970 and 2012 [252]. Continuation of these trends could result
in the loss of two-thirds of species populations by 2020 (only 4 years
from now) compared to 1970 levels (i.e., in just half a century).
ally still below the world average (1.87 toe) [87,88].
The rest of the developing world, with the poten-
tial to reach similar levels of per capita emissions,
has more than three times China’s population. Fur-
thermore, China’s 2010 per capita carbon emissions
(6.2 metric tons) were still only about a third of the
US (17.6 metric tons) [89], indicating much more
growth can still occur [86].
However, overall inequality in resource con-
sumption and waste generation is greater than what
these comparisons between countries demonstrate
since resource consumption within countries is
skewed towards higher income groups. In some
countries, the Gini coefficient for carbon emis-
sions (e.g., 0.49 in China and 0.58 in India [90])
is actually higher than the Gini coefficient for
income (0.42 and 0.34 in 2010, respectively [91]).
Rather than disaggregating resource consumption
within countries, using national per capita GDP
calculations and projections provides a distorted
understanding of the distribution and characteristics
of resource use and waste generation. Consumption
patterns and associated per capita shares of resource
use and pollution differ enormously, and using
a consumption-based calculation rather than a
national territorial production-based approach
demonstrates even further the extent of global eco-
nomic and environmental inequality: about 50% of
the world’s people live on less than $3 per day, 75%
on less than $8.50, and 90% on less than $23 (US$
at current purchasing power parity). The top 10%,
with 27.5 metric tons of GHG emissions per capita,
produce almost as much total GHG emissions (46%
of global total) as the bottom90% combined (54%),
with their per capita GHG emission of only 3.6
metric tons [87,90] (see Fig. 2).
Furthermore, even if per capita emissions sta-
bilize or decline in the developed countries, pop-
ulation growth in these wealthy countries will re-
main a major driver of future increases in resource
use and emissions. While some consider popula-
tion growth a serious issue only in very poor coun-
tries, large population growth is still projected for
some of the wealthiest countries today. For ex-
ample, US, Canada, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway,
Australia, and New Zealand are each projected to
grow by about an additional 40%–80%.9 Popula-
tion growth in the developed countries is likely to
be much higher than these UN estimates project
9 TheUS, one of the highest resource use per capita countries in theworld
(e.g., with an energy consumption per capita 4 times that of China and
16 times that of India in 2010 [87]), is projected to grow in popula-
tion by∼50% from both natural increase and immigration, generating a
very large increase in total resource use and waste generation for the US
alone.
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Resource use by the wealthiest 10% of world population produces almost as much 
GHG emissions as the bottom 90%. To raise everyone to the average standard of 
living of those earning >$23/day would require ~5 times total GHG emissions. 
Figure 2. Global inequality in greenhouse gas emissions.
because these estimates include arbitrary projec-
tions of very low future immigration from less devel-
oped countries.10 A model that uses these UN pop-
10 For example, while Africa’s population is projected to rise over 6-fold
from 366 million in 1970 to 2.4 billion in 2050, the UN’s projection of
annual net emigration from Africa remains about constant until 2050,
at ∼500,000, similar to the average from 1970 to 2000, thus the pro-
jected percentage emigrating declines sharply. (For comparison, be-
tween 1898 and 1914, ∼500,000 people emigrated each year just from
Italy alone, when its population was only 30–35 million.) Then, from
2050 to 2100, the annual net emigration is arbitrarily projected to
smoothly decline to zero, even as Africa’s projected population contin-
ues rising to over 4 billion [3]. However, recent international migration
has increased on average with global population [253] and net migra-
tion to thedeveloped countries has increased steadily from1960 to2010
[3] and more explosively recently. Thus, the UN projection of emigra-
tion seems unrealistically low, both relative to its increasing population
and in the context of a rapidly aging, and supposedly shrinking, popula-
tion in the developed countries, as well as recentmigration pattern alter-
ations following conflicts and associated social disruptions. The United
Nations High Commissioner on Refugees estimates that by the end of
2015, a total of 65.3 million people in the world were forcibly displaced,
increasing at a rate of ∼34,000 people per day. There are 21.3 million
refugees worldwide, with more than half from Afghanistan, Syria, and
Somalia [254]. Yet, this figure only reflects refugees due to persecution
and conflict but does not include refugees as a result of climate change,
famines, and sea level rise. Netmigration in 2015 toGermany alone was
1.1 million [255].The UN’s 2012 projections of migration for other re-
gions are similarly arbitrary and unrealistic. Net annual emigration from
Latin America is projected to decline from nearly 1.2 million in 2000–
2010 to∼500,000by2050, and thendecline to zeroby2100.Net annual
immigration to Europe rose from 41,000 in 1960–1970 to almost 2 mil-
lion in 2000–2010, and explosively today due to increasing social strife,
ulation projections incorporates these arbitrary and
unrealistic assumptions into their projections, un-
dermining its reliability. This is one reason why it is
essential to project demographic variables endoge-
nously within the models. One result of such unre-
alistically low projections of future migration to the
developed countries is to produce lower estimates
of future total emissions of the developed countries,
which means the developed countries are not re-
quired to make as much effort today to lower their
own emissions.11
Furthermore, the UN projections of a relatively
stable population for the whole of the developed
world depend on dramatic, and highly unlikely, de-
clines projected in a handful of key countries. Japan,
for example, must decline by ∼34%, Germany by
∼31%, and Russia by ∼30% for the projected sta-
bility in total developed country population to be
born out.12 In addition, countries often highlighted
for their low birth rates, like Italy and Spain, are not
projected to decline by even 1% for decades. Small
increases in fertility and/or immigration could ex-
tend that period for decades longer. Even without
those increases in fertility or immigration, the total
population of developed countries is not projected
by the UN to peak until about 2050, and trajectories
beyond that are very difficult to predict given their
high dependence on future policies.13
Since population is stabilizing in some countries,
it is often thought that the human population explo-
sion of the 20th century (growing by a factor of∼4)
and yet, the UN’s projection for 2010–2050 is a continuous decline in
net immigration down to only 900,000 by 2050, and then a decline to
zeroby2100 [3]. Even theUNPopulationDivision itself admits, ‘We re-
alize that this assumption is very unlikely to be realized but it is quite im-
possible to predict the levels of immigration or emigration within each
country of the world for such a far horizon’ [3].
11 In order to limit the total increase in average global temperatures
within the context of current climate change negotiations over carbon
budgets, there is amaximum total amount of carbon that can be emitted
globally, thus carbon emissions must be apportioned across countries
and across time. Lower estimates of migration to developed countries
means lower estimates of emissions in the future in developed countries,
whichmeans the developed countries are not required tomake asmuch
effort today to lower their own emissions [104].
12 These dramatic declines appear highly unlikely given that countries like
Japan and Germany have not yet declined by more than ∼1% [3], and
already their governments have enacted a series of policies to encourage
higher birth rates. In fact, there is evidence for the efficacyof various fam-
ily policies in the recent fertility rebounds observed in several developed
countries [97]. Similarly, Russia, which saw its fertility rate plunge after
1989 (reaching a low of 1.19 in 1999 from2.13 in 1988), enacted prona-
talist policies and liberalized immigration.The fertility rate has since re-
bounded, and the population decline reversed in 2009.
13 Despite widespread talk of population decline, it is important to empha-
size that the only countries in theworld to have experienced anydeclines
beyond∼1% have all been associated with the special circumstances of
the collapse of the former Soviet Bloc (and some microstates, such as a
few island nations), and even in these cases, migration has played a ma-
jor role in population changes.This is even true within Germany, where
the only La¨nder (provinces) which have declined significantly in popu-
lation are all from the former East Germany.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/nsr/article-abstract/3/4/470/2669331 by U
niversity of N
ew
castle user on 11 Septem
ber 2018
REVIEW Motesharrei et al. 477
is over, and since rates of growth have been declin-
ing, family planning and population growth are no
longer concerns. However, the UN projections of a
stabilization in global population [3] are so far into
the future (after 2100) that the projections are unre-
liable [8] and global stabilization itself is highly un-
certain [92]. In fact, alternate projection method-
ologies suggest with muchmore certainty that stabi-
lization is unlikely to occur [93]. Furthermore, even
the UN projections are based on large assumed de-
creases in fertility rates inmuch of theworld. If those
projected decreases in fertility rates are off by only
0.5 births per woman (an error of less than 10% in
many high-fertility countries), the date at which the
world reaches 11 billion will occur five decades ear-
lier andwill raise the global total population by 2100
tonearly 17billion and still rapidly growing [3].Cur-
rent projections should be understood in the con-
text of past projections that have overestimated fer-
tility declines.14 Pastmistakenprojections reflect the
use of highly questionable assumptions about fertil-
ity rate declines in developing countries [92] that
tend to reproduce a ‘natural’ decline following the
trajectory of more developed countries. Yet, the em-
pirical record shows that reductions (or increases) in
fertility rates reflect a complex range of sociodemo-
graphic, economic, and policy conditions [94–100].
If those conditions are not present, the projected de-
clines will not necessarily occur, as can be seen in
countries like Niger (7.4 births per woman in 1970,
7.6 in 2012) [101,102]. Needless to say, the use of
demographic projections with overestimated fertil-
ity declines again produces underestimated projec-
tions of future resource use and emissions.
Even with these assumptions of large fertility de-
clines in the projections, each additional billion hu-
mans added will not be spread evenly across the
planet. The vast majority of the growth will be con-
centrated in countries that today continue to have
very high rates of fertility (∼25 countries above 5,
∼45 above 4, and ∼65 above 3). These countries
are also the lowest income countries in the world,
with the lowest resource use per capita, whichmeans
that themajority of populationgrowth is takingplace
precisely in regions with the highest potential for
growth in resource use per capita over the coming
14 For example, the 1999 UN projections significantly overestimated the
time it would take to add the next billion people [256]. Worse still, the
2015estimate for theworld’s total population in2100 [1]has goneupby
over 2 billion just since the 2004 estimate [257]. Even the 2010UNpro-
jections had to be revised upwards in 2012because previous estimates of
total fertility rates in a number of countries were too low, and in some of
the poorest countries the level of fertility appears to have actually risen
in recent years [3,258,259], and the 2012 estimates have again been re-
vised upwards in 2015 [1]. To put all this in perspective, the 2004 es-
timates projected a peak in world population of 9.22 billion, but in the
2015 projection, 9.22 billion will be reached as early as 2041, and will
still be followed by at least another six decades of growth.
decades [87], and the growth of the total impact
is the product of the two. For example, the lowest-
income continent, Africa, which had 230 million
people in 1950 and over a billion in 2010 (a 4-fold
increase in one lifetime) is currently on track to
add another 3 billion in the next 85 years (an-
other 4-fold increase in one lifetime). Nigeria, by it-
self, is projected to reach almost 1 billion people.
These high projections already assume very large de-
creases in fertility rates from their current average
levels of approximately 5 children/woman in Sub-
Saharan Africa. (Without this projected decrease
in fertility rates, Africa alone would add 16 billion
rather than 3 billion more people by 2100 [3].)
The UN medium range projections show that the
developing world (not including China) will grow
by an additional 2.4 billion people in just the next
three and a half decades, and a total of an addi-
tional 4 billion by 2100. Due to these uneven pop-
ulation growth rates, ∼90% of the world’s popula-
tion will be living in today’s less developed coun-
tries, with most of the growth in the poorest of these
countries [3].15
Current projections of future resource use and
greenhouse gas emissions used in the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports
and Integrated Assessment Models (discussed fur-
ther in the third Section) also depend heavily on
a continuation of high levels of global economic
inequality and poverty far into the future. Projec-
tions that global resource use and emissions will not
rise very much due to rapid population growth in
the poorest countries are based on the assumption
that those countries will remain desperately poor
by the standards of developed countries. (This as-
sumption again provides the added benefit for to-
day’s wealthy countries that the wealthy countries
have to make less effort today to reduce their own
emissions. Given total global carbon emissions tar-
gets, projections of low economic growth in poor
countries translate into less stringent carbon reduc-
tion requirements in wealthy countries [103,104].)
However, China’s recent rapid rise in emissions per
capita shows this is a potential future path for the rest
of thedevelopingworld.Toargueotherwise requires
assuming that today’s developing countries will
15 Poorer populations are expected to bemore heavily impacted by climate
change and other mounting environmental challenges despite having
contributed much less to their causes [136,166,167,260]. International
and internal migration is increasingly being seen as an important com-
ponent of adaptation and resilience to climate change and a response
to vulnerabilities from other environmental risks. Given the aging social
structures in some parts of theworld, policies that support increasedmi-
gration could be important not only for environmental adaptation, but
also for the realization of other socioeconomic and demographic goals.
Thus, migration will help both the sending and receiving countries. Of
course, given the scale of projected population growth, migration alone
is unlikely to be able to balance the regional disparities.
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remain in desperate poverty, and/or will adopt tech-
nologies that the developed countries themselves
have yet to adopt. Real-world CO2 emissions have
tracked the high end of earlier emissions scenarios
[105], and until the currently wealthy countries can
produce a large decline in their own emissions per
capita, it is dubious to project that emissions per
capita in the less developed countries will not con-
tinue on a trajectory up to the levels of currently
wealthy countries.16
As we will show, all of these points raise the
critical issue of the accuracy and reliability of the
assumptions underlying the projections of key Hu-
man System variables, such as inequality, popula-
tion, fertility, health, per capita GDP, and emissions
per capita.These are the central elements inmany of
the standardmodels used to explore the future of hu-
manity and the environment, such as various IAMs
used to guide policy, and models used by the IPCC
whose output guides international negotiations on
energy use and emissions. Common to thesemodels
is their deficiency in capturing dynamic bidirectional
feedbacks between key variables of the Human Sys-
tem and the Earth System; instead, they simply use
independentprojectionsofHumanSystemvariables
in Earth SystemModels.
HUMAN SYSTEM THREATENS TO
OVERWHELM THE CARRYING CAPACITY
AND ECOSYSTEM SERVICES OF EARTH
SYSTEM
Economic theories that endorse limitless growth are
based on a model of the economy that, in essence,
does not account for the resource inputs and waste-
absorption capacities of the environment, and the
16 The scientific community has urged limiting the global mean surface
temperature increase relative to pre-industrial values to 2◦C. The eco-
nomic challenges of staying on a 2◦C pathway are greater, the longer
emission reductions are postponed [261]. Given the role that devel-
oped countries have played historically in the consumption of fossil
fuels, and their much higher per capita carbon emissions today, it is
imperative that the developed countries lead the way and establish a
successful track record in achieving such reductions. Thus, it is positive
that at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Conference of the Parties (COP21) in Paris in December 2015, gov-
ernments crafted an international climate agreement indicating their
commitments to emissions reduction for the near term (to 2025 or
2030). Most importantly, the US committed to reduce economy-wide
GHG emissions below 2005 levels by 26%–28% in 2025, and the EU
has committed to reduce 2030 GHG emissions relative to 1990 by 40%
(excluding emissions from land-use changes). Assuming that the goals
of the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) are
fulfilled, the results in [262] and [261] show that a successful Paris
agreement on near-term emissions reductions will be valuable in re-
ducing the challenges of the dramatic long-term transformations re-
quired in the energy system to limit global warming to 2◦C. The Paris
framework will succeed even further if it enables development of sub-
sequent pathways leading to the required additional global emissions
reductions.
limitations of technological progress and resource
substitutability. In other words, these theories es-
sentially model the economy as a perpetual motion
machine [106]. But in the real world, economic ac-
tivity both consumes physical material and energy
inputs and produces physical waste outputs. The
Earth System performs the functions (‘ecosystem
services’) of providing both the sources of these ma-
terial and energy inputs to the human economy, as
well as the sinkswhich absorb and process the pollu-
tion and waste outputs of the human economy. See
Figs 3 and4 [20,106–109]. Since the scale of theHu-
man System has grown dramatically relative to the
Earth System’s capacity to provide these ecosystem
services, the problems of depletion and pollution have
grown dramatically.
HermanDaly has pointed out that themagnitude
and growth rates of resource input and waste out-
put are not sustainable: ‘We are drawing down the
stock of natural capital as if it was infinite’ [110].
For example, the rapid consumption of fossil fu-
els is releasing vast stocks of carbon into the at-
mospheric and ocean sinks at a rate about a mil-
lion times faster than Nature accumulated these car-
bon stocks.17 Furthermore, while certain sectors of
global society have benefited from the growth of the
past 200 years, the environmental consequences are
global in their impact, and the time scale of degrada-
tion of the resulting waste products (e.g., emissions,
plastics, nuclearwaste, etc.) is generallymuch longer
than they took to produce or consume. Contrary to
some claims within the field of Economics, physical
laws do place real constraints on the way in which
materials and energy drawn from the Earth System
can be used and discharged by the Human System
[111–114]. To be sustainable, human consump-
tion and waste generation must remain at or below
what can be renewed and processed by the Earth
System.
It is often suggested that technological change
will automatically solve humanity’s environmen-
tal sustainability problems [115–117]. However,
there are widespread misunderstandings about the
effects of technological change on resource use.
There are several types of technological changes,
and these have differing effects on resource use.
While some changes, such as in efficiency tech-
nologies, can increase resource-use efficiency, other
changes, such as in extraction technologies and con-
sumption technologies, raise the scale of resource
extraction and per capita resource consumption. In
addition, absent policy effects, even the increased
17 As another example, millions of metric tons of plastic enter the oceans
every year and accumulate throughout the world’s oceans, especially in
all subtropical gyres [263,264].
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Factors:  
Population, Affluence, Technology, Policies 
  Key Variables: Fertility, Migration, GDP/cap, Health, 
  Materials & Energy/cap, Waste & Emissions/cap, etc. 
  (Levels, Rates of Change, Distributional Inequalities) 
 
Sectors:  
  Water, Agriculture, Energy, Industry,  
  Construction, Transportation, Trade  
     
    Sources 
 
Non-Renewable Stocks, 
  Regenerating Stocks,   
    Renewable Flows    
 
 Sinks 
 
   Atmosphere,  
   Ocean, Rivers 
   Lakes, Land  
  Inputs 
 Energy 
 Coal, Oil, Gas,  
 Nuclear,  
 Renewables,  
 Biofuels,  
 etc. 
Materials 
Water, Biomass,  
 Soils, Minerals,  
   Chemicals, 
         etc. 
  
 Outputs 
  Emissions 
  CO2, CH4, N2O,   
  SOx, NOx, etc. 
      Wastes 
         Garbage, Toxics,  
         Wastewater,  
         Nuclear, etc. 
  Land-Use  
    Desertification,  
     Deforestation,  
     Urbanization,  
               etc. 
Human System-Earth System Relationship 
The Human System is within the Earth System:  
- ES provides the sources of the inputs to HS. 
- HS outputs must be absorbed by ES sinks. 
However, current models are not bidirectionally coupled. 
Figure 3. Relationship of the Human System within the Earth System, not separate
from it (after [110]). The Earth System provides the sources of the inputs to, and the
sinks that absorb the outputs of, the Human System.
technological efficiencies in resource use, are often
compensated for by increases in consumption asso-
ciated with the ‘Rebound Effect’ [118–121 ]. Fur-
thermore, advances in production technologies that
appear to be increases in productivity are instead
very often due to greater energy andmaterial inputs,
accompanied by greater waste outputs. While the
magnitude and even the sign of the effect of tech-
nological change on resource use varies greatly, the
empirical record shows that the net effect has been a
continued increase in global per capita resource use,
waste generation, andemissionsdespite tremendous
technological advances.
While per capita emissions of developed coun-
tries appear to be stabilizing when measured within
the country of production, this is largely due to
the shift in the location of energy-intensive man-
ufacturing to developing countries, and estimates
of developed countries’ per capita emissions mea-
sured based on their consumption show that they
continued to grow [122–130]. Even if today’s in-
dustrialized societies can stabilize their resource
use (at probably already unsustainable levels), large
parts of the world are in the midst of this in-
dustrial transition and the associated technologi-
cal regime shift from agrarian to industrial soci-
ety that greatly increases per capita resource use
and waste production [131,132].18 For example,
from just 1971 to 2010, total primary energy use
per capita in Korea increased by a factor of 10,
from 0.52 to 5.16 toe [88]. Therefore, techno-
logical advancement can add to the problems of
global sustainability, rather than solve them. The
question is not only whether technology can help
solve environmental sustainability challenges, but
also what policies and measures are required to
develop the right technologies and adopt them in
time. Technological advances could, and should, be
part of the solutions for environmental and sustain-
ability problems, for example, by transitioning to
renewables, increasing use efficiency, and fostering
behavioral changes to cut resource use and emis-
sions, particularly in the high-resource-using coun-
tries. But these technological solutions do not just
happen by themselves; they require policies based
on scientific knowledge and evidence to guide and
support their development and adoption.
An important concept for the scientific study of
sustainability is Carrying Capacity (CC), the to-
tal consumption—determined by population, in-
equality, and per capita consumption—that the re-
sources of a given environment can maintain over
the long term [110,133].19 Consumption of natural
resources by a population beyond the rate that na-
ture can replenish overshoots the Carrying Capacity
of a given system and runs the risk of collapse. Col-
lapses in population are common in natural systems
18 The effect of technological change can be observed in the transition
from agrarian to industrial society. This industrialization raised agricul-
tural yields largely due to increasing inputs, thereby allowing rapid Hu-
man System expansion, but it also generated a societal regime shift that
greatly increased per capita resource use and waste generation [131].
19 One can generalize the definition of Carrying Capacity to any subsys-
tem with different types of natural resources coupled with sociodemo-
graphic variables. For example, the subsystems for water, energy, and
agriculture—each coupled bidirectionally to human sociodemographic
variables and to each other—result inWater CC, Energy CC, and Agri-
culture CC.Water CC can be defined as the level of population that can
be sustained at a particular per capita consumption and a given level of
water sources and supply in the areaunder study. In general, this level de-
pends on both human and natural factors. For example,Water CC is de-
terminedby thenatural flowrateofwater into andoutof the area, precip-
itation and evaporation, withdrawal rate fromwater sources, dispensing
technology, recycling capacity, etc. Moreover, Water, Energy, or Agri-
culture CC in a certain area can be imported from other regions to tem-
porarily support a larger population and consumption [123,265,266].
Recent literature has emphasized the integrated nature of agricultural,
energy, andwater resources, andmodeling the interactions of these sub-
systems is essential for studying the food–energy–water nexus [267–
271]. In order to understand andmodel eitherHumanorEarth Systems,
wemustmodel all these natural andhuman subsystems interactively and
bidirectionally coupled.
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Sinks:Sources:
Sinks
When the Human System was small relative to the 
Earth System, the two could be modeled separately.
The Human System has grown so large that 
both must now be modeled coupled to each other.
In
pu
ts
O
ut
pu
tsInputs Outputs
Sources
Sources Sinks
Capacity of ES sources was large relative to HS inputs. 
HS outputs were small relative to absorption of ES sinks.
Now, HS inputs and outputs are so large relative to the ES, 
they threaten to deplete its sources and overwhelm its sinks.
Figure 4. Growth of the Human System has changed its relationship with the Earth System and thus both must be modeled interactively to account for
their feedback on each other.
and have occurred many times in human societies
over the last 10,000 years.20
To study keymechanisms behind such collapses,
Motesharrei et al. [134] developed a two-way cou-
pledHuman andNature Dynamicmodel, by adding
accumulated wealth and economic inequality to a
predator–prey model of human–nature interaction.
Themodel shows that both economic inequality and
resource overdepletion can lead to collapse, in agree-
ment with the historical record. Experiments pre-
sented in that paper for different kinds of societies
show that as long as total consumption does not
overshoot the CC by toomuch, it is possible to con-
verge to a sustainable level. However, if the over-
shoot is too large, a collapse becomes difficult to
avoid (see Fig. 5).21 Modern society has been able to
20 A recent study focusing on the many collapses that took place in Ne-
olithic Europe concluded that endogenous causes, i.e., overrunning CC
and the associated social stresses, have been the root cause of these col-
lapses [214,272].
21 Collapses could also happen due to rapid decline of CC as a result of
environmental degradation. Droughts and climate change can decrease
natural capacities and regeneration rates, which in turn lead to a decline
of CC. (Motesharrei et al. [134] describe how tomodel these factors for
a generic system, termed Nature Capacity and Regeneration Rate, and
how they determineCC.)The resulting gap between total consumption
andCC can lead to conflicts and the ensuing collapses. For example, see
recent literature that shows the impacts of climate change on conflicts
[159–161], a potential precursor to collapses.
grow far beyond Earth’s CC by using nonrenewable
resources such as fossil fuels and fossil water. How-
ever, results from the model show that an unsus-
tainable scenario can be made sustainable by reduc-
ing per capita depletion rates, reducing inequality to
decrease excessive consumption by the wealthiest,
and reducing birth rates to stabilize the population
[134]. The key question is whether these changes
can be made in time.
Current models of climate change include sea
level rise, land degradation, regional changes in tem-
perature and precipitation patterns, and some con-
sequences for agriculture, but without modeling the
feedbacks that these significant impacts would have
on the Human System, such as geographic and
economic displacement, forced migration, destruc-
tion of infrastructure, increased economic inequal-
ity, nutritional sustenance, fertility, mortality, con-
flicts, and spread of diseases or other human health
consequences [135,136].
For example, nearly all features of the hydro-
logic system are now impacted by the Human
System [60] with important feedbacks onto hu-
mans, e.g., snowpack decline due to climate change
[53] reduces water availability; agricultural pro-
cesses further affect water availability and water
quality [54]; and land-use changes can reduce
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Figure 5. Example results from [134]. (Left panel) A type-N (Nature) collapse due to both overdepletion of Nature and inequality. (Right panel) A type-L
(Labor) collapse: after an apparent equilibrium, population collapses due to overexploitation of Labor, although Nature eventually recovers.
groundwater recharge [77].Thus many populations
face both reduced water availability and increased
flood frequency and magnitude [76]. Furthermore,
chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing, which in-
volves cracking shale rock deep underground to ex-
tract oil and gas, can contaminate groundwater re-
sources [137–139]. In addition, the injection of
wastewater from oil and gas operations for disposal
into deep underground wells is also altering the
stresses of geologic faults, unleashing earthquakes
[140].22 Increases in the frequency and magnitude
of extreme weather events can impact agriculture
and ecosystems [71,141].
Changes in the structure and functions of the
ecosystem can also pose important threats to hu-
man health in many different ways [142]. Climate,
climatic events (e.g., El Nin˜o), and environmen-
tal variables (e.g., water temperature and salinity)
can play a fundamental role in the spread of dis-
eases [143–146]. A recent report by the US Global
Change Research Program illustrates how climate
change could affect human health through vari-
ous processes and variables such as temperature-
related death and illness, air quality, extreme events,
vector-borne diseases, water-related illness, food
safety and nutrition, and mental health and well-
being [147].23 Environmental catastrophes can re-
sult in the decline of national incomes for a few
decades [148], andhigher temperatures can severely
affect human health [149] and reduce economic
productivity [150]. This effect is in addition to the
22 For example, ‘Until 2008not a single earthquakehad ever been recorded
by the U.S. Geological Survey from the Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW)
area...Since then, close to 200 have shaken the cities and their imme-
diate suburbs. Statewide, Texas is experiencing a sixfold increase in
earthquakes over historical levels. Oklahoma has seen a 160-fold spike
in quakes...In 2014 the state’s earthquake rate surpassed California’s’.
[273].
23 TheUSGCRP report states that ‘Current and future climate impacts ex-
pose more people in more places to public health threats...Almost all of
these threats are expected to worsen with continued climate change’.
well-established reduction in agricultural yields due
to higher temperatures [151–156]. Climate could
also be a strong driver of civil conflicts [157–161].
Environmental change is also a known trigger of hu-
man migration [162–164]. These, in turn, will sig-
nificantly increase the unrealistically small futuremi-
gration projections described in the second Section
of this paper. In fact, climate change alone could
affect migration considerably through the conse-
quences of warming and drying, such as reduced
agricultural potential, increased desertification and
water scarcity, and other weakened ecosystem ser-
vices, as well as through sea level rise damaging
and permanently inundating highly productive and
densely populated coastal lowlands and cities [165–
168]. Furthermore, the impacted economic activi-
ties and migration could then feed back on human
health [169]. Bidirectional coupling is required to
include the effects of all of these feedbacks.
BIDIRECTIONAL COUPLING OF HUMAN
SYSTEM AND EARTH SYSTEMMODELS
IS NEEDED. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY:
DYNAMIC MODELING, INPUT–OUTPUT
MODELS, DATA ASSIMILATION
Coupled systems can reveal new and com-
plex patterns and processes not evident when
studied separately. Unlike systems with only
unidirectional couplings (or systems that just
input data from extrapolated or assumed pro-
jections), systems with bidirectional feedbacks
often produce nonlinear dynamics that can
result in counterintuitive or unexpected out-
comes [170]. Nonlinear systems often feature
important dynamics which would be missed if
bidirectional interactions between subsystems are
not modeled. These models also may call for very
different measures and policy interventions for
sustainable development than those suggested
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by models based on exogenous forecasts of key
variables.
The need for bidirectional coupling can be
seen from the historical evolution of Earth System
modeling. In the 1960s, atmospheric scientists de-
veloped thefirstmathematicalmodels tounderstand
the dynamics of the Earth’s climate, starting with at-
mospheric models coupled to simple surface mod-
els (e.g., [171]). Over the following decades, new
components such as ocean, land, sea-ice, clouds,
vegetation, carbon, and other chemical constituents
were added to make Earth System Models more
physically complete. These couplings needed to be
bidirectional in order to include feedbacks [171].
The importance of accounting for bidirectional feed-
backs is shown by the phenomenon of El Nin˜o-
Southern Oscillation (ENSO), which results from
the coupleddynamicsof theocean–atmosphere sub-
systems. Until the 1980s, atmospheric and ocean
models were unidirectionally coupled (in a simple,
‘one-way’ mode): the atmospheric models were af-
fected by sea surface temperatures (SST) but could
not change them, and ocean models were driven
by atmospheric wind stress and surface heat fluxes,
but could not change them. Such unidirectional cou-
pling could not represent the positive, negative, and
delayed feedbacks occurring in nature that produce
ENSO episodes. Zebiak and Cane [172] developed
the first prototype of a bidirectional coupled ocean–
atmosphere model.This model, for the first time, al-
lowed prediction of El Nin˜o several seasons in ad-
vance [173]. Similarly, improving the modeling of
droughts requires bidirectional coupling of the at-
mosphere and land submodels (see, for example,
[174]). Most current climate models have since
switched to fully coupled atmosphere–ocean–land–
ice submodels.This example shows that we canmiss
very important possible outcomes if the model fails
to consider bidirectional feedbacks between differ-
ent coupled components of systems that the model
represent. Since the Human System has become
dominant, it is essential to couple the Earth andHu-
man Systemsmodels bidirectionally in order to sim-
ulate their positive and negative feedbacks, better re-
flecting interactions in the real world.24
24 Such interactions take place not just at a global scale but also at the
ecosystem and local habitat scales. Ecosystems at the regional and lo-
cal scales provide critical habitat for wildlife species, thus preserving
biodiversity, and are also an essential source of food, fiber, and fuel
for humans, and forage for livestock. Ecosystem health, composition,
function, and services are strongly affected by both human activi-
ties and environmental changes. Humans have fundamentally altered
land cover through diverse use of terrestrial ecosystems at the lo-
cal scale, which then impact systems at the global scale. Additional
changes have taken place as a result of climate change and variabil-
ity [274]. Furthermore, human pressures are projected to have ad-
ditional repercussions for species survival, biodiversity, and the sus-
This coupling process has taken place to a cer-
tain extent, but the coupling does not include bidi-
rectional feedbacks between the Human and Earth
Systems. Energy and Agriculture sectors have been
added to ESMs creating comprehensive Integrated
Assessment Models. There are now several impor-
tant, advanced IAMs, including MIT’s IGSM, US
DOE’s GCAM, IIASA’s MESSAGE, the Nether-
lands EAA’s IMAGE, etc25 [175–180 ]. However, in
the IAMs, many of which are used in producing the
IPCC reports, population levels are obtained from
a demographic projection like the UN’s population
projections discussed in the first and second Sec-
tions, which do not include, for example, impacts
that climate changemay have on theHuman System
[181].
In today’s IAMs, tables of projecteddemographic
and socioeconomic variables determine changes in
resource use and pollution/emission levels, which in
turn can determine Earth System variables such as
atmospheric temperature. However, changes in re-
source levels, pollution, temperature, precipitation,
etc. estimated by the IAMs cannot, in turn, impact
levels of these Human System variables and proper-
ties because they are exogenous to the IAMs.This is
true even for the scenarios of the IPCC, which are
constructed without full dynamic coupling between
the human and natural systems. Although there are
certain IAMs that include some couplings within
human subsystems, critical feedbacks from natural
systems onto demographic, economic, and human
health variables are missing, so that the coupling
tainability of ecosystems, and in turn feedback on humans’ food
security and economic development [141]. Thus, a key challenge
to manage change and improve the resilience of terrestrial ecosys-
tems is to understand the role that different human and environ-
mental forces have on them, so that strategies that target the actual
drivers and feedbacks of coupled components of change can be de-
veloped and implemented. Understanding how terrestrial ecosystems
function, how they change, andwhat limits their performance is critically
important to determine theirCarryingCapacity for accommodating hu-
man needs as well as serving as a viable habitat for other species, espe-
cially in light of anticipated increase in global population and resource
consumption for the rest of this century and beyond. Biodiversity and
ecosystem services in forests, farmlands, grazing lands, and urban land-
scapes are dominated by complex interactions between ecological pro-
cesses and human activities. In order to understand such complexity at
different scales and the underlying factors affecting them, an integrated
Human–Earth systems science approach that couples both societal and
ecological systems is needed. Humans and their activities are as impor-
tant to the changing composition and functionof theEarth systemas the
environmental conditions and their natural variability. Thus, coupled
models are needed to meet the challenges of overcoming mismatches
between the social and ecological systems and to establish newpathways
toward ‘development without destruction’ [242–248,250,251].
25 MIT:Massachusetts Institute of Technology; IGSM: IntegratedGlobal
System Modeling framework; US DOE: United States Department of
Energy; GCAM: Global Change Assessment Model; IIASA: Interna-
tional Institute forAppliedSystemsAnalysis;MESSAGE:Model forEn-
ergy Supply Systems And their General Environmental impact; EAA:
Environmental Assessment Agency; IMAGE: Integrated Modelling of
Global Environmental Change.
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between human subsystems and the Earth System in
most current modeling is unidirectional, whereas in
reality, this coupling is bidirectional [181].
Without including suchcoupled factors, the inde-
pendent projections of population levels, economic
growth, and carbon emissions could be based on in-
consistent or contradictory assumptions, and hence
could be inherently incorrect. For example, theUN’s
population projections assume fertility declines in
today’s lowest-income countries that follow trajec-
tories established by higher-income countries.How-
ever, the economic growth projections and, there-
fore, per capita carbon emission projections, assume
today’s poorest countries will not grow close to any-
where near the level of today’s wealthy countries.
The 45 lowest income countries are projected to
grow to∼$6,500GDP per capita by 2100 [104] but
the average GDP per capita of today’s high-income
countries is ∼$45,000. Rather than relying on pro-
jections, the demographic component of any cou-
pledmodelmust include the factors that contributed
to the demographic transition in other countries,
such as education, family planning, health care, and
other government policies and programs [98,182–
184].
Projections of key variables in a realistic model
should not be based on mechanistic temporal ex-
trapolations of those variables but rather on the in-
trinsic internal dynamics of the system. Specifically,
key parameters of the Human System, such as fer-
tility, health, migration, economic inequality, unem-
ployment, GDP per capita, resource use per capita,
and emissions per capita, must depend on the dy-
namic variables of the Human–Earth coupled sys-
tem.26 Not including these feedbacks would be like
trying tomakeElNin˜opredictions usingdynamic at-
26 Furthermore, the use of GDP as a key measure and determinant in
these future projections is itself highly problematic, because it is a
very weak measure of human well-being, economic growth, or societal
prosperity [275]. GDP neither accounts for the value of natural capi-
tal nor human capital, ignores income and wealth inequality, neglects
both positive and negative externalities, and only captures social costs
and environmental impacts to the extent that prices incorporate them.
Any economic activity, whether deleterious or not, adds to GDP as long
as it has a price. For example, labor and resources spent to repair or re-
place loss due to conflicts or environmental damages are counted as if
they add to—rather than subtract from—total output. Alternativemea-
sures, such as the Genuine Progress Indicator, the Sustainable Society
Indicator, the Human Development Index, and the Better Life Index of
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, have
been developed [276–278].These measures show that, especially since
the 1970s, the large increases in GDP in the developed countries have
not beenmatchedby increases inhumanwell-being. Integrated and cou-
pled Human–Earth system models will allow for the development of
much more accurate and realistic measures of the actual productivity of
economic activity and its costs and benefits for human well-being. Such
measures will allow for the valuation of both natural and human capital
and for defining and developing sustainability metrics that are inclusive
of the wealth of natural and human capital.They will also bring together
the current disparate debates on environment/climate, economics, de-
mographics, policies, andmeasures to put theHuman–Earth System on
a more sustainable path for current and future generations.
mosphericmodels butwith sea surface temperatures
as an external input basedon futureprojections inde-
pendently produced (e.g., by the UN) without feed-
backs.
To address the above issues, the development
of coupled global Human–Earth System frame-
works that capture and represent the interactive
dynamics of the key subsystems of the coupled
human–nature system with two-way feedbacks are
urgently needed. The global Human–Earth Sys-
tem framework we propose, and represent schemat-
ically in Fig. 6, combines not only data collec-
tion, analysis techniques, and Dynamic Modeling,
but also Data Assimilation, to bidirectionally cou-
ple an ESM containing subsystems for Global At-
mosphere, Land (including both Land–Vegetation
and Land-Use models) and Ocean and Ice, to a
Human SystemModel with subsystems for Popula-
tion Demographics, Water, Energy, Agriculture, In-
dustry, Construction, and Transportation. The De-
mographics subsystem includes health and public
policy factors that influence key variables such as
fertility, disease, mortality, and immigration rates,
while theWater, Energy, Agriculture, Industry,Con-
struction, and Transportation subsystems include
cross-national input–output modeling to provide
the consumption-based resource-input and waste-
output ‘footprint’ accounting analyses missing from
the territorial-based methods.27
The need for global Earth System frameworks
coupled to population drivers has been recom-
mended since the 1980s, in the pioneering report by
the Earth System Sciences Committee of the NASA
Advisory Council, chaired by Francis P. Brether-
ton [185]. While Earth System components and
27 Input–Output analysis can account for the flows of resource inputs, in-
termediate and finished goods and services, andwaste outputs along the
production chain [279,280]. By accounting for the impacts of the full
upstream supply chain, IO analysis has been used in life-cycle analysis
[281] and for linking local consumption to global impacts along global
supply chains [122,127,282,283]. IO models can be extended with en-
vironmental parameters to assess different environmental impacts from
production and consumption activities, including water consumption
[123,284,285], water pollution [285,286], carbon dioxide emissions
[287–289], land-use and land-cover change [130,290,291], and biodi-
versity [283]). Such models have been developed and applied at vari-
ous spatial and temporal scales. Since emissions embodied in trade have
been growing rapidly, resulting in an increasing divergence between
territorial-based and consumption-based emissions, territorialmeasures
alone cannot provide a comprehensive and accurate analysis of the fac-
tors driving emissions nor the effectiveness of reduction efforts [292].
IOmodels can provide these consumption-based calculations and have
been employed to identify and quantify key drivers for emissions and
energy consumption (such as population growth, changes of consump-
tion patterns, and technical progress [288,293,294]) as well as the en-
vironmental impacts of social factors (such as urbanization and migra-
tion) reflecting consumption patterns of different categories of house-
holds with high spatial detail [282,295]. IO analysis can also be used for
simulating potential future states of the economy and the environment
(e.g., [296]), through dynamically updating technological change and
final demand, or employing recursive dynamics to explore explicit sce-
narios of change.
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Figure 6. Schematic of a Human–Earth System with drivers and feedbacks.
needed feedbacks were described and interaction of
the Earth System and theHuman Systemwas shown
in the report,multiple subsystemsof theHumanSys-
tem and feedbacks between those subsystems and
with the Earth System were not fully included. The
coupled framework proposed here includes the ma-
jor subsystems and components of the Human Sys-
tem as well as their major feedbacks and risks, and
explicitly recognizes policies as a major driver of the
full system.
ESMs have long been based on integrating their
dynamical equations numerically (e.g., numerical
weather prediction models used by Weather Ser-
vices). For Human Systems, Dynamic Modeling is
also a powerful tool that scientists have success-
fully applied to many systems across a range of eco-
nomic, social, and behavioral modeling [113,186–
189]. The ability of dynamic models to capture
various interactions of complex systems, their po-
tential to adapt and evolve as the real system
changes and/or the level of the modelers’ under-
standing of the real system improves, their ability to
model coupled processes of different temporal and
spatial resolutions and scales, and their flexibility to
incorporate and/or couple tomodels based on other
approaches (such as agent-basedmodeling, stochas-
ticmodeling, etc.) render themas a versatile and effi-
cient tool to model coupled Earth–Human Systems
[190–193]. Since ESMs are already dynamic, a dy-
namic modeling platform would be a natural choice
to model coupled Earth–Human Systems. Figure 7
is a schematic showing an example of amodel to cou-
ple energy and water resources at the local and re-
gional scales to human population.28
28 Many of the variables in such a model are affected by processes at the
global scale, while decisions are often made at a local scale. Choos-
ing variables from the subsystems depends on the specific goals of the
model. Reconciling various scales spatially or temporally can be done
through downscaling, aggregating, and averaging for variables defined
at smaller scales.Moreover, theHuman System strongly influences con-
sumption even at these smaller local scales. For example, Srebric et al.
[297] show that not only population size but also behavior of people
at the community scale strongly affects local energy consumption. This
example shows that coupled Human System models are needed at var-
ious scales to project consumption patterns, especially for energy and
water. We thank the anonymous Reviewer No. 2 for emphasizing the
importance of coupling across various scales, and formany other helpful
comments.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/nsr/article-abstract/3/4/470/2669331 by U
niversity of N
ew
castle user on 11 Septem
ber 2018
REVIEW Motesharrei et al. 485
Figure 7. An example of a model schematic integrating water and energy resources with human population and health at the local and regional scales,
coupled to an ESM at the global scale.
Amajor challenge in implementing such a frame-
work of a coupled Earth–Human System is that
it requires tuning many parameters to approxi-
mately reproduce its past observed evolution. This
task has become easier over the last decade with
the development of advanced methods of Data
Assimilation commonly used in atmospheric sci-
ences to optimally combine a short forecast with
the latest meteorological observations in order
to create accurate initial conditions for weather
forecasts generated several times a day by the
National Weather Services (e.g., [194–198]). The
most methods (known as 4D-Var and Ensemble
Kalman Filter) are able to go over many years of ob-
servations using a dynamic forecasting model and
estimate the optimal value of model parameters for
which there are no observations (e.g., [199–206]).
Uncertainty is another important challenge in
producing future behavior and scenarios with mod-
els. This problem has been addressed successfully
in meteorology by using, instead of a single fore-
cast, an ensemble of typically 20–200 model fore-
casts created by adding perturbations in their ini-
tial conditions and in the parameters used in the
models.These perturbations are selected to be com-
patible with estimated uncertainties of the param-
eters and initial conditions [207–210]. The intro-
duction of ensemble forecasting in the early 1990s
provided forecasters with an important measure of
uncertainty of the model forecasts on a day-to-day
and region-to-region basis. This made it possible to
extend the length of the US National Weather Ser-
vices weather forecasts made available to the pub-
lic from 3 days to 7 days (e.g., [196]). A similar ap-
proach, i.e., running ensembles ofmodel projections
with perturbed parameters, could be used with cou-
pled Earth–Human System models to provide poli-
cymakerswith an indicator of uncertainty in regional
or global projections of sustainability associated
withdifferent policies andmeasures.Calibration and
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tuning of coupled Human–Earth System models, as
indicated above, could take advantage of optimal pa-
rameter estimation using advanced Data Assimila-
tion, rather than following the more traditional ap-
proachof tuning individual parameters or estimating
them from available observations.
Our proposed framework, together with Data
Assimilation techniques, allows developing, test-
ing, and optimizing measures and policies that can
be implemented in practice for early detection of
critical or extreme conditions that will lead to ma-
jor risks to society and failure of supporting sys-
tems and infrastructure, and aid in the estima-
tion of irreversible thresholds or regime-shifting
tipping points [211–213]. Moreover, it allows for
detecting parameters and externalities (such as
inadequate measures or policies) that may play
a significant role in the occurrence of catastro-
phes and collapses [214–217]. By adjusting the
values of those parameters found to be influen-
tial through numerical experiments and simulations,
short-term and long-term policy recommendations
that can keep the system within optimum levels
or sustainable development targets (e.g., Millen-
nium Development Goals or the Post-2015 Devel-
opment Agenda) can be designed and tested. This
approach would allow policies and measures that
have been found to be successful in specific cases
to be modeled under different conditions or more
generally.29 Effective policies and measures are
needed for all sectors of the Human–Earth Sys-
temModel described above [184,218]. A dynamical
29 There are numerous examples of policies successfully tackling many of
the challenges identified in this paper. For example, the province of Mi-
siones, Argentina, with policies for forest protection and sustaining lo-
cal incomes, stands out by having very high, remotely sensed values of
NDVI (vegetation index) compared to the neighboring regions [298].
Thestate ofKerala, India, despite a very lowGDPper capita (under $300
until 1990s), through policies expanding access to education and medi-
cal care, enjoys higher life expectancy, lower birth rates, lower inequality,
and superior education compared to the rest of India [299–301]. For-
mal primary, secondary, and tertiary education can also reduce societal
inequalities and improve economic productivity [98,182,184,302]. Ed-
ucation itself can also be offered in other forms. For example, education
through mass media can be influential for changing long-term cultural
trends and social norms, as can be seen in the successful attempt to re-
duce fertility rates in Brazil using soap operas [303]. There have also
been other extremely successful noncoercive family planning policies,
e.g., inThailand,Mexico, and Iran [94,99,183,304–308]. A recent paper
in PNAS [309] showed that slowing population growth could provide
16%–29%of the emissions reductions neededby2050 andby37%–41%
by 2100, and a study byWire [310] shows family planning is four times
as efficient as adopting low-carbon technologies for reducing carbon in
the atmosphere and ocean. Successful local and regional policies on air
quality includeCalifornia sharply reducingNO2 inLosAngeles by 6.0±
0.7% per year between 1996 and 2011 through strict policies on vehicu-
lar emissions [311].Maryland succeeded in reducing SO2 emissions per
unit energy produced from power plants by ∼90% [312]. Regulations
have reduced levels of SO2 and NO2 over the eastern US by over 40%
and 80%, respectively, between 2005 and 2015. Over a similar period
in India, these levels grew by more than 100% (SO2) and 50% (NO2),
showing the possible dangers ahead absent effective policies [313].
model of such systems should be capable of testing
the effects of various policy choices on the long-term
sustainability of the system [215].
The track record until recently on climate change
shows policy inaction is both dangerous and can be
very costly [168,193,219]. And yet, despite a long
history of scientific warnings (please see Footnote
30 for a detailed description30), the many current
ecological and economic impacts and crises, the fu-
ture risks and dangers, the large number of interna-
tional meetings and conferences on the urgent need
for climate policies and measures, and the adop-
tion of some national and regional climate policies,
growth in global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and
cement has not only remained strong but is actually
accelerating.The average annual rate of growth from
2000–2009(∼2.9%)was almost triple the rateof the
previous two decades, 1980–1999 (∼1.1%), while
the most recent years, 2010–2012, have been even
higher (∼3.4%) [127,220].
The sobering fact is that very little has been
accomplished in establishing effective carbon
reduction policies and measures based on science.
The development and implementation of poli-
cies promoting sustainable technologies for the
future (e.g., renewable energy sources) becomes
even more challenging because of intervention
and obstruction by a number of vested interests
for continued and expanded use of their existing
nonrenewable technologies and resources (e.g.,
some in the coal, oil, and gas industries). This is
30 Anthropogenic climate change driven by carbon emissions, water vapor,
and surface albedo was theorized as early as the 19th century, and an
empirical warming trend was measured by the 1930s. Scientists came
to understand the fundamental mechanisms of climate change by the
1950s and 60s (e.g., [314,315]). The first international scientific Con-
ference on the Study of Man’s Impact on Climate was held in 1971 and
issued a report warning about the possibilities of melting polar ice, re-
duced albedo, and other unstable feedbacks that could lead to acceler-
ated climate change ‘as a result of man’s activities’ [316]. By 1979, a US
National Academy of Sciences panel, chaired by Jule Charney, issued a
report confirming the findings of climate changemodels [317], and over
the course of the 1980s, the empirical evidence confirming ongoing cli-
mate change grew very rapidly. In 1988, James Hansen testified before
the US Congress about the near certainty of climate change. The first
IPCCAssessment Report was completed in 1990, and the Fifth in 2014,
with each report successively warning of the increasingly grave conse-
quences of our current trajectory. The latest report warns that without
new and effective policies and measures, increases in global mean tem-
perature of 3.7◦C–4.8◦Care projected by 2100 relative to pre-industrial
levels (median values; the range is 2.5◦C–7.8◦C) [318]. Other national
and global institutions have also warned of the disastrous consequences
of suchwarming (e.g., [274]). As a recentWorld Bank assessment [261,
p. xvii] states, ‘The data show that dramatic climate changes, heat and
weather extremes are already impacting people, damaging crops and
coastlines and putting food, water, and energy security at risk...The task
of promoting human development, of ending poverty, increasing global
prosperity, and reducing global inequality will be very challenging in
a 2◦C [increase] world, but in a 4◦C [increase] world there is serious
doubt whether this can be achieved at all...the time to act is now’. Sci-
entists have also long warned about the consequences of climate change
for international security (e.g., [319–321]).
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/nsr/article-abstract/3/4/470/2669331 by U
niversity of N
ew
castle user on 11 Septem
ber 2018
REVIEW Motesharrei et al. 487
further complicated by some political rejection
of science-based future climate projections and
unwillingness to consider alternative economic
development pathways to lowering the emission of
carbon dioxide and other GHGs from the Human–
Earth systems. However, the commitments to
reduce carbon emissions by the vast majority of the
world’s countries in the recent agreement from the
COP21 in Paris could signify a major policy turning
point.31
One of the anonymous reviewers pointed out
that the failure of policymakers to react sufficiently
to the scientific understanding of global warming is
paralleled by a similar failure with regard to scien-
tific knowledge about population trajectories. Fam-
ily planning policies have been pushed off policy
agendas for the last few decades, and the subject of
population has even become taboo. There are nu-
merous non-evidence-based barriers that separate
women from the information and means necessary
to plan childbirths. The total fertility rate remains
high in many countries not because women want
many children but because they are denied these
technologies and information, and often even the
right to have fewer children. Access to family plan-
ning information and voluntary birth control is a ba-
sic human right and should be treated as such by
international institutions and policy frameworks.
Similarly, there is also an urgent need for improved
educational goals worldwide. While these goals are
repeatedly supported by both researchers and pol-
icymakers, policy implementation continues to be
lacking. As a recent report by the Royal Society (the
UK National Academy of Sciences) explains, im-
proved education (especially for women) andmeet-
ing the large voluntary family planningneeds that are
still unmet in both developed and developing coun-
tries are fundamental requirements of future eco-
nomic prosperity and environmental sustainability.
This again emphasizes the critical need for science-
based policies [98,182,184,218,221–227].32
31 Withmore than 180 countries, covering∼90%of global emissions, hav-
ing committed to submit INDCs, the Paris framework forms a system
of country-level, nationally determined emissions reduction targets that
can be regularly monitored and periodically escalated. While analysis
[262] of the INDCs indicates that, if fully implemented, they can reduce
the probability of reaching the highest levels of temperature change by
2100 and increase the probability of limiting global warming to 2◦C,
achievement of these goals still depends on the escalation of mitigation
action beyond the Paris Agreement. Even if the commitments are
fulfilled, they are not enough to stay below the 2◦C pathway
[261,262,322], but the Paris framework is an important start for an
eventual transformation in policies andmeasures.Thus, the INDCs can
only be a first step in a deeper process, and the newly created framework
must form an effective foundation for further actions on emissions
reductions.
32 We thank anonymous Reviewer No. 1 for guiding us to add all the im-
portant points in this paragraph and the associated citations.
The importance and imminence of sustainability
problems at local and global scales, the dominant
role that the Human System plays in the Earth Sys-
tem, and the key functions and services the Earth
System provides for the Human System (as well as
for other species), all call for strong collaboration
of earth scientists, social scientists, and engineers
in multidisciplinary research, modeling, technology
development, and policymaking. To be successful,
such approaches require active involvement across
all disciplines that aim to synthesize knowledge,
models, methods, and data. To take effective action
against existing and potential socio-environmental
challenges, global society needs scientifically-based
development of appropriate policies, education that
raises collective awareness and leads to actions, in-
vestment to build new or improved technologies, and
changes in economic and social structures. Guided
by such knowledge, with enough resources and ef-
forts, and only if done in time, human ingenuity
can harness advances in science, technology, engi-
neering, and policy to develop effective solutions for
addressing the challenges of environment and cli-
mate, population, and development. Only through
well-informed decisions and actions can we leave
a planet for future generations in which they can
prosper.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We benefited from helpful discussions with many colleagues in-
cluding ProfessorsMikeWallace, JimCarton, Inez Fung, Deliang
Chen, Jim Yorke, Ross Salawitch, Margaret Palmer, Russ Dicker-
son, Paolo D’Odorico, and Steve Penny.
We thankMr IanMunoz andDr PhilippeMarchand for tech-
nical assistance in producing Fig. 1.
As is the casewith all independentpeer-reviewed research, the
views and conclusions in the paper are those of the authors alone.
The funding organizations did not have any role in writing the pa-
per and did not review it.
FUNDING
This work was supported by the University of Maryland Coun-
cil on the Environment 2014 Seed Grant (1357928). The au-
thors would like to acknowledge the following grants and in-
stitutions: SM, KF, and KH: National Socio-Environmental
Synthesis Center (SESYNC)—US National Science Founda-
tion (NSF) award DBI-1052875; JR: The Institute of Global
Environment and Society (IGES); GRA: Laboratory Directed
Research and Development award by the Pacific Northwest Na-
tional Laboratory, which is managed by the BattelleMemorial In-
stitute for the US Department of Energy; MAC: Office of Naval
Research, research grantMURIN00014-12-1-0911; FMW:NSF
award CBET-1541642; VMY: The Institute for New Economic
Thinking (INET).
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/nsr/article-abstract/3/4/470/2669331 by U
niversity of N
ew
castle user on 11 Septem
ber 2018
488 Natl Sci Rev, 2016, Vol. 3, No. 4 REVIEW
REFERENCES
1. United Nations. TheWorld Population Prospects: 2015 Revision, Key Findings
and Advance Tables. Working Paper ESA/P/WP.241. United Nations, Depart-
ment of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2015.
2. Christenson M. Global population growth. Technical report. US Census Bu-
reau. 2002.
3. United Nations. World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, Highlights
and Advance Tables. Working Paper ESA/P/WP.228. United Nations, Depart-
ment of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2013.
4. Krausmann F, Gingrich S and Eisenmenger N et al. Growth in global materials
use, GDP and population during the 20th century (data updated in 2011). Ecol
Econ 2009; 68: 2696–705.
5. Erisman JW, Sutton MA and Galloway J et al. How a century of ammonia
synthesis changed the world. Nat Geosci 2008; 1: 636–9.
6. Smil V. Enriching the Earth: Fritz Haber, Carl Bosch, and the transformation of
world food production. Cambridge, MA, USA; London, UK: MIT press, 2004.
7. Smil V. Detonator of the population explosion. Nature 1999; 400: 415.
8. Warren SG. Can human populations be stabilized? Earth Future 2015; 3:
2014EF000275.
9. Barnosky AD, Hadly EA and Bascompte J et al. Approaching a state shift in
Earth’s biosphere. Nature 2012; 486: 52–8.
10. Crutzen PJ. Geology of mankind. Nature 2002; 415: 23.
11. Crutzen PJ. The “Anthropocene”. In: Ehlers E and Krafft T (eds). Earth System
Science in the Anthropocene. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2006, 13–8.
12. Rockstro¨m J, Steffen W and Noone K et al. Planetary boundaries: exploring
the safe operating space for humanity. Ecol Soc 2009; 14: 32.
13. Foley JA, DeFries R and Asner GP et al. Global consequences of land use.
Science 2005; 309: 570–4.
14. Haberl H, Erb KH and Krausmann F et al. Quantifying and mapping the human
appropriation of net primary production in earth’s terrestrial ecosystems. Proc
Natl Acad Sci USA 2007; 104: 12942–7.
15. Haberl H, Erb KH and Krausmann F et al.Global bioenergy potentials from agri-
cultural land in 2050: sensitivity to climate change, diets and yields. Biomass
Bioenerg 2011; 35: 4753–69.
16. ImhoffML, Bounoua L and Ricketts T et al.Global patterns in human consump-
tion of net primary production. Nature 2004; 429: 870–3.
17. Krausmann F, Erb KH and Gingrich S et al. Global human appropriation of net
primary production doubled in the 20th century. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2013;
110: 10324–9.
18. Lauk C and Erb KH. Biomass consumed in anthropogenic vegetation fires:
Global patterns and processes. Ecol Econ 2009; 69: 301–9.
19. Liu Y, Li Y and Li S et al. Spatial and temporal patterns of global NDVI trends:
correlations with climate and human factors. Remote Sens. 2015; 7: 13233–
50.
20. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Ecosystems and HumanWell-being: Syn-
thesis, Vol. 5. Washington, DC: Island Press, 2005.
21. Rojstaczer S, Sterling SM and Moore NJ. Human appropriation of photosyn-
thesis products. Science 2001; 294: 2549–52.
22. Zeng N and Yoon J. Expansion of the world’s deserts due to vegetation-albedo
feedback under global warming. Geophys Res Lett 2009; 36.
23. Zeng N, Zhao F and Collatz GJ et al. Agricultural Green Revolution as a driver
of increasing atmospheric CO2 seasonal amplitude.Nature 2014; 515: 394–7.
24. Imhoff ML, Tucker CJ and LawrenceWT et al. The use of multisource satellite
and geospatial data to study the effect of urbanization on primary productivity
in the United States. IEEE Trans Geosci Remote Sens 2000; 38: 2549–56.
25. Krausmann F, Erb KH and Gingrich S et al. Global patterns of socioeconomic
biomass flows in the year 2000: a comprehensive assessment of supply, con-
sumption and constraints. Ecol Econ 2008; 65: 471–87.
26. Tilman D, Balzer C and Hill J et al. Global food demand and the sustainable
intensification of agriculture. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2011; 108: 20260–4.
27. Tilman D, Cassman KG and Matson PA et al. Agricultural sustainability and
intensive production practices. Nature 2002; 418: 671–7.
28. Kareiva P, Watts S andMcDonald R et al. Domesticated nature: shaping land-
scapes and ecosystems for human welfare. Science 2007; 316: 1866–9.
29. Lyons SK, Smith FA and Brown JH. Of mice, mastodons and men: human-
mediated extinctions on four continents. Evol Ecol Res 2004; 6: 339–58.
30. Gleeson T. Regional strategies for the accelerating global problem of ground-
water depletion. Nat Geosci 2012; 5: 853–61.
31. Do¨ll P, Mu¨ller Schmied and Schuh C et al. Global-scale assessment of ground-
water depletion and related groundwater abstractions: combining hydrologi-
cal modeling with information from well observations and GRACE satellites.
Water Resour Res 2014; 50: 5698–720.
32. Scholes MC and Scholes RJ. Dust unto dust. Science 2013; 342: 565–6.
33. Vitousek PM,Mooney HA and Lubchenco J et al. Human domination of Earth’s
ecosystems. Science 1997; 277: 494–9.
34. Li Y, Zhao M and Motesharrei S et al. Local cooling and warming effects of
forests based on satellite observations. Nat Commun 2015.
35. Li Y, De Noblet-Ducoudre´ N and Davin EL et al. The role of spatial scale and
background climate in the latitudinal temperature response to deforestation.
Earth Syst Dynamics 2016; 7: 167–81.
36. Ciais P, Sabine C and Bala G et al. Carbon and other biogeochemical cy-
cles. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of
Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013,
465–570.
37. Hansen J, Kharecha P and Sato M et al. Assessing “Dangerous Climate
Change”: required reduction of carbon emissions to protect young people, fu-
ture generations and nature. PLoS One 2013; 8: e81648.
38. Marland G, Boden TA and Andres RJ. Global, regional, and national fossil fuel
CO2 emissions. Technical report. Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory US Department of Energy 2012.
39. Notz D and Stroeve J. Observed Arctic sea-ice loss directly follows anthro-
pogenic CO2 emission. Science 2016; aag2345.
40. Galloway JN, Dentener FJ and Capone DG et al. Nitrogen cycles: past,
present, and future. Biogeochemistry 2004; 70: 153–226.
41. Canfield DE, Glazer AN and Falkowski PG. The evolution and future of Earth’s
nitrogen cycle. Science 2010; 330: 192–6.
42. Gruber N and Galloway JN. An Earth-system perspective of the global nitro-
gen cycle. Nature 2008; 451: 293–6.
43. Holtgrieve GW, Schindler DE and HobbsWO et al. A coherent signature of an-
thropogenic nitrogen deposition to remote watersheds of the northern hemi-
sphere. Science 2011; 334: 1545–8.
44. Howarth R, Swaney D and Billen G et al. Nitrogen fluxes from the landscape
are controlled by net anthropogenic nitrogen inputs and by climate. Front Ecol
Environ 2012; 10: 37–43.
45. Vitousek P, Aber J and Howarth R et al. Human alteration of the global
nitrogen cycle: sources and consequences. Ecol Appl 1997; 7: 737–50.
WOS:A1997XQ08100002.
46. Cai WJ, Hu X and Huang WJ et al. Acidification of subsurface coastal waters
enhanced by eutrophication. Nat Geosci 2011; 4: 766–70.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/nsr/article-abstract/3/4/470/2669331 by U
niversity of N
ew
castle user on 11 Septem
ber 2018
REVIEW Motesharrei et al. 489
47. Carstensen J, Andersen JH and Gustafsson BG et al. Deoxygenation of the
Baltic Sea during the last century. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2014; 111: 5628–
33.
48. Ekstrom JA, Suatoni L and Cooley SR et al. Vulnerability and adaptation of US
shellfisheries to ocean acidification. Nat Clim Change 2015; 5: 207–14.
49. Melzner F, Thomsen J and Koeve W et al. Future ocean acidification will be
amplified by hypoxia in coastal habitats.Mar Biol 2012; 160: 1875–88.
50. Rabotyagov S, Kling C and Gassman P et al. The economics of dead zones:
causes, impacts, policy challenges, and a model of the Gulf of Mexico hypoxic
zone. Rev Environ Econ Policy 2014; 8: 58–79.
51. Tilman D, Fargione J andWolff B et al. Forecasting agriculturally driven global
environmental change. Science 2001; 292: 281–4.
52. Vaquer-Sunyer R and Duarte CM. Thresholds of hypoxia for marine biodiver-
sity. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2008; 105: 15452–7.
53. Barnett TP, Pierce DW and Hidalgo HG et al. Human-induced changes in the
hydrology of the Western United States. Science 2008; 319: 1080–3.
54. Gordon LJ, Peterson GD and Bennett EM. Agricultural modifications of hydro-
logical flows create ecological surprises. Trends Ecol Evol 2008; 23: 211–9.
55. Grasby S. World water resources at the beginning of the 21st century. Geosci
Canada 2004; 31.
56. Meybeck M. Global analysis of river systems: from Earth system controls to
Anthropocene syndromes. Philos Trans R Soc 2003; 358: 1935–55.
57. Molden D. Water for Food, Water for Life: A Comprehensive Assessment of
Water Management in Agriculture. London, UK; Sterling, VA, USA: Earthscan,
2007.
58. Molle F, Wester P and Hirsch P. River basin closure: processes, implications
and responses. Agric Water Manag 2010; 97: 569–77.
59. Vo¨ro¨smarty CJ, Green P and Salisbury J et al. Global water resources: vulner-
ability from climate change and population growth, Science 2000; 289: 284.
60. Wagener T, SivapalanM and Troch PA et al. The future of hydrology: an evolv-
ing science for a changing world.Water Resour Res 2010; 46: W05301.
61. Castle SL, Thomas BF and Reager JT et al. Groundwater depletion during
drought threatens future water security of the Colorado River Basin. Geophys
Res Lett 2014; 41: 2014GL061055.
62. Famiglietti JS. The global groundwater crisis. Nat Clim Change 2014; 4:
945–8.
63. Famiglietti JS, LoM and Ho S et al. Satellites measure recent rates of ground-
water depletion in California’s Central Valley. Geophys Res Lett 2011; 38:
L03403.
64. Famiglietti JS and Rodell M. Water in the balance. Science 2013; 340:
1300–1.
65. Konikow LF. Groundwater Depletion in the United States (1900-2008). US Ge-
ological Survey Scientific Investigations Report 20135079, US Department of
the Interior, US Geological Survey, 2013.
66. Rodell M, Velicogna I and Famiglietti JS. Satellite-based estimates of ground-
water depletion in India. Nature 2009; 460: 999–1002.
67. Scanlon BR, Faunt CC and Longuevergne L et al. Groundwater depletion and
sustainability of irrigation in the US High Plains and Central Valley. Proc Natl
Acad Sci USA 2012; 109: 9320–5.
68. Voss KA, Famiglietti JS and Lo M et al. Groundwater depletion in the Mid-
dle East from GRACE with implications for transboundary water manage-
ment in the Tigris-Euphrates-Western Iran region.Water Resour Res 2013; 49:
904–14.
69. Cai W, Borlace S and Lengaigne M et al. Increasing frequency of extreme El
Nin˜o events due to greenhouse warming. Nat Clim Change 2014; 4: 111–6.
70. Cai W, Wang G and Santoso A et al. Increased frequency of extreme La Nin˜a
events under greenhouse warming. Nat Clim Change 2015; 5: 132–7.
71. Easterling DR, Meehl GA and Parmesan C et al. Climate Extremes: observa-
tions, modeling, and impacts. Science 2000; 289: 2068–74.
72. Meehl GA and Tebaldi C.More intense, more frequent, and longer lasting heat
waves in the 21st century. Science 2004; 305: 994–7.
73. Mei W and Xie SP. Intensification of landfalling typhoons over the northwest
Pacific since the late 1970s. Nat Geosci 2016.
74. Wuebbles D, Meehl G and Hayhoe K et al. CMIP5 Climate model analy-
ses: climate extremes in the United States. Bull Am Meteorol Soc 2013; 95:
571–83.
75. Arnold CL and Gibbons CJ. Impervious surface coverage: the emergence of a
key environmental indicator. J Am Plan Assoc 1996; 62: 243–58.
76. Di Baldassarre F, Castellarin A and Brath A. Analysis of the effects of levee
heightening on flood propagation: example of the River Po, Italy. Hydrol Sci J
2009; 54: 1007–17.
77. Scanlon BR, Keese KE and Flint AL et al. Global synthesis of groundwater
recharge in semiarid and arid regions. Hydrol Processes 2006; 20: 3335–70.
78. Steffen W, Sanderson RA and Tyson PD et al. Global Change and the Earth
System: A Planet Under Pressure. Berlin, Germany; Heidelberg, Germany;
New York, USA: Springer Science & Business Media, 2006.
79. Steffen W, Broadgate W and Deutsch L et al. The trajectory of the Anthro-
pocene: the great acceleration. Anthropocene Rev 2015.
80. Pacyna JM and Pacyna EG. An assessment of global and regional emissions
of trace metals to the atmosphere from anthropogenic sources worldwide.
Environ Rev 2001; 9: 269–98.
81. Palmer MA, Bernhardt ES and Schlesinger WH et al. Mountaintop Mining
Consequences. Science 2010; 327: 148–9.
82. Kolbert E. The Sixth Extinction: AnUnnatural History, 1st edn. NewYork: Henry
Holt and Co., 2014.
83. Mace GM, Masundire H and Baillie J. Biodiversity. In: Hassan R, Scholes RJ
and Ash N (eds). Ecosystems and HumanWell-being: current state and trends.
Vol. 1. Washington, DC: Island Press, 2005, pp. 77–122.
84. Regan HM, Lupia R and Drinnan AN et al. The currency and tempo of extinc-
tion. Am Nat 2001; 157: 1–10.
85. Baumert KA, Herzog T and Pershing J. Navigating the numbers: Greenhouse
gas data and international climate policy. USA: World Resources Institute,
2005.
86. Balatsky AV, Balatsky GI and Borysov SS. Resource demand growth and sus-
tainability due to increased world consumption. Sustainability 2015; 7: 3430–
40.
87. Lawrence S, Liu Q and Yakovenko VM. Global inequality in energy consump-
tion from 1980 to 2010. Entropy 2013; 15: 5565–79.
88. OECD. OECD Factbook 2014. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, 2014.
89. World Bank. World development indicators 2014, Table 3.8: energy depen-
dency, efficiency and carbon dioxide emissions. Technical report. World Bank.
2014.
90. Hubacek K, Baiocchi G and Feng K et al. Global income inequality and carbon
footprints: can we have the cake and eat it too? In Dejua´n O´ and Cadarso MA´
(eds). Environmental and economic impacts of decarbonization. Input-output
studies on the consequences of the 2015 Paris agreements Abingdon, UK:
Routledge, 2017 In press.
91. World Bank. World development indicators 2014. Technical report. World
Bank 2014.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/nsr/article-abstract/3/4/470/2669331 by U
niversity of N
ew
castle user on 11 Septem
ber 2018
490 Natl Sci Rev, 2016, Vol. 3, No. 4 REVIEW
92. Heilig GK, Buettner T and Li N et al. Future Population Trends Found to be
Highly Uncertain in Least Developed Countries. 2010.
93. Gerland P, Raftery AE and Sˇevcˇı´kova´ H et al. World population stabilization
unlikely this century. Science 2014; 346: 234–7.
94. Bongaarts J. Development: Slow down population growth. Nature 2016; 530:
409–12.
95. CampbellM, Sahin-Hodoglugil NN and PottsM. Barriers to fertility regulation:
a review of the literature. Stud Fam Plan 2006; 37: 87–98.
96. CampbellMM, Prata N and PottsM. The impact of freedom on fertility decline.
J Fam Plan Reprod Health Care 2013; 39: 44–50.
97. Luci-Greulich A and The´venon O. The impact of family policies on fertility
trends in developed countries. Eur J Popul 2013; 29: 387–416.
98. Lutz W, Butz WP and KC S (eds).World Population and Human Capital in the
Twenty-First Century. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014.
99. Potts M. Sex and the birth rate: human biology, demographic change, and
access to fertility-regulation methods. Popul Dev Rev 1997; 23: 1–40.
100. Potts M. Getting family planning and population back on track. Glob Health,
Sci Pract 2014; 2: 145–51.
101. Potts M, Gidi V and Campbell M et al. Too little, too late. Int Perspect Sex
Reprod Health 2011; 95–101.
102. PRB. World population data sheet. Technical report. Population Reference Bu-
reau 2014.
103. Raupach MR, Davis SJ and Peters GP et al. Sharing a quota on cumulative
carbon emissions. Nat Clim Change 2014; 4: 873–9.
104. Stanton EA. Development without carbon: climate and the global econ-
omy through the 21st Century. Technical report. Stockholm Environment
Institute—US Center 2011.
105. Friedlingstein P, Andrew RM and Rogelj J et al. Persistent growth of CO2
emissions and implications for reaching climate targets. Nature Geoscience
2014; 7: 709–15.
106. Daly HE. Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable Development. Boston,
MA, USA: Beacon Press, 1996.
107. Daily G. Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence On Natural Ecosystems.
Washington, DC, USA: Island Press, 1997.
108. Daily GC, Polasky S and Goldstein J et al. Ecosystem services in decision mak-
ing: time to deliver. Front Ecol Environ 2009; 7: 21–8.
109. Kareiva P, Tallis H and Ricketts TH et al. Natural Capital: Theory and Practice of
Mapping Ecosystem Services. New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 2011.
110. Daly HE and Farley J. Ecological Economics: Principles And Applications, 1st
edn. Island Press, 2003.
111. Cleveland CJ and RuthM.When, where, and by howmuch do biophysical lim-
its constrain the economic process?: a survey of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen’s
contribution to ecological economics. Ecol Econ 1997; 22: 203–23.
112. Georgescu-RoegenN. The Entropy Law and the Economic Process. Cambridge,
MA, USA: Harvard University Press, 1971.
113. Ruth M. Integrating Economics, Ecology and Thermodynamics, Vol. 3 of the
Book Series Ecology, Economy & Environment. Netherlands: Springer, 1993.
114. Ruth M. A quest for the economics of sustainability and the sustainability of
economics. Ecol Econ 2006; 56: 332–42.
115. NordhausWD, Houthakker H and Solow R. The allocation of energy resources.
Brook Pap Econ Act 1973; 1973: 529–76.
116. Simon JL. The Ultimate Resource. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1981.
117. Solow RM. The economics of resources or the resources of economics. Am
Econ Rev 1974; 64: 1–14.
118. Greening LA, Greene DL and Difiglio C. Energy efficiency and consumption—
the rebound effect—a survey. Energy Policy 2000; 28: 389–401.
119. Polimeni JM, Mayumi K and Giampietro M et al. The Jevons Paradox and the
Myth of Resource Efficiency Improvements. London, UK; Sterling, VA, USA:
Earthscan, 2008.
120. Ruth M. The nature of the beast and the beast in nature: broadening the per-
spective of technology. Bull Sci, Technol Soc 2009; 29: 374–82.
121. Smil V. Long-range energy forecasts are nomore than fairy tales.Nature 2008;
453: 154.
122. Davis SJ and Caldeira K. Consumption-based accounting of CO2 emissions.
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2010; 107: 5687–92.
123. Feng K, Chapagain A and Suh S et al. Comparison of bottom-up and top-down
approaches to calculating the water footprints of nations. Econ Syst Res 2011,
23: 371–85.
124. Que´re´ CL, Moriarty R and Andrew R et al. Global carbon budget 2014. Earth
Syst Sci Data Disc 2014; 7: 521–610.
125. Peters GP, Davis S and Andrew R. A synthesis of carbon in international trade.
Biogeosciences 2012; 9: 3247–76.
126. Peters GP. From production-based to consumption-based national emission
inventories. Ecol Econ 2008; 65: 13–23.
127. Peters GP, Minx JC and Weber CL et al. Growth in emission transfers via
international trade from 1990 to 2008. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2011; 108:
8903–8.
128. Sathaye J, Lucon O and Rahman A et al. Renewable energy in the context
of sustainable energy. In: Edenhofer O, Pichs-Madruga R and Sokona Y et al.
(eds). IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change
Mitigation. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, USA: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2011.
129. Weber CL, Peters GP and Guan D et al. The contribution of Chinese exports to
climate change. Energ Policy 2008; 36: 3572–7.
130. Yu Y, Feng K and Hubacek K. Tele-connecting local consumption to global land
use. Glob Environ Change 2013; 23: 1178–86.
131. Krausmann F, Schandl H and Sieferle RP. Socio-ecological regime transitions
in Austria and the United Kingdom. Ecol Econ 2008; 65: 187–201.
132. Schaffartzik A, Mayer A and Gingrich S et al. The global metabolic transition:
regional patterns and trends of global material flows, 19502010. Glob Environ
Change 2014; 26: 87–97.
133. CattonWR. Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary Change. Urbana
and Chicago, IL, USA: University of Illinois Press, 1980.
134. Motesharrei S, Rivas J and Kalnay E. Human and nature dynamics (HANDY):
modeling inequality and use of resources in the collapse or sustainability of
societies. Ecol Econ 2014; 101: 90–102.
135. Guzma´n JM, Martine G and McGranahan G et al. Population Dynamics and
Climate Change. New York, USA; London, UK: UNFPA and IIEE, 2009.
136. Ruth M and Ibarrara´n M. Distributional Impacts of Climate Change and Disas-
ters: Concepts and Cases. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward
Elgar Publishing, 2009.
137. DiGiulio DC and Jackson RB. Impact to underground sources of drinking wa-
ter and domestic wells from production well stimulation and completion
practices in the Pavillion, Wyoming, Field. Environ Sci Technol 2016; 50:
4524–36.
138. Jackson RB, Lowry ER and Pickle A et al. The depths of hydraulic fracturing
and accompanying water use across the United States. Environ Sci Technol
2015; 49: 8969–76.
139. Vaidyanathan G. Fracking can contaminate drinking water. Sci Am 2016.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/nsr/article-abstract/3/4/470/2669331 by U
niversity of N
ew
castle user on 11 Septem
ber 2018
REVIEW Motesharrei et al. 491
140. Shirzaei M, Ellsworth WL and Tiampo KF et al. Surface uplift and time-
dependent seismic hazard due to fluid injection in eastern Texas. Science
2016; 353: 1416–9.
141. Rosenzweig C, Iglesias A and Yang X et al. Climate change and extreme
weather events; implications for food production, plant diseases, and pests.
Glob Change Hum Health 2001; 2: 90–104.
142. Myers SS, Gaffikin L and Golden CD et al. Human health impacts of ecosystem
alteration. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2013; 110: 18753–60.
143. Colwell RR. Global climate and infectious disease: the Cholera Paradigm. Sci-
ence 1996; 274: 2025–31.
144. Lipp EK, Huq A and Colwell RR. Effects of Global Climate on Infectious Dis-
ease: the Cholera Model. Clin Microbiol Rev 2002; 15: 757–70.
145. Lobitz B, Beck L and Huq A et al. Climate and infectious disease: use of remote
sensing for detection of Vibrio cholerae by indirect measurement. Proc Natl
Acad Sci USA 2000; 97: 1438–43.
146. PascualM, Rodo´ X and Ellner SP et al. Cholera dynamics and El Nin˜o-Southern
oscillation. Science 2000; 289: 1766–9.
147. Crimmins A, Balbus J and Gamble Jl et al. The Impacts of Climate Change
on Human Health in the United States: A Scientific Assessment. Washington,
DC: United States Global Change Research Program, 2016.
148. Hsiang SM and Jina AS. The Causal Effect of Environmental Catastrophe on
Long-Run Economic Growth: Evidence From 6,700 Cyclones. Working Paper
20352. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014.
149. Romeo Upperman C and Parker J et al. Frequency of extreme heat event as a
surrogate exposure metric for examining the human health effects of climate
change. PLOS One 2015; 10: e0144202.
150. Hsiang SM. Temperatures and cyclones strongly associated with economic
production in the Caribbean and Central America. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA
2010; 107: 15367–72.
151. Lobell DB and Field CB. Global scale climate-crop yield relationships and the
impacts of recent warming. Environ Res Lett 2007; 2: 014002.
152. Lobell DB, Schlenker W and Costa-Roberts J. Climate trends and global crop
production since 1980. Science 2011; 333: 616–20.
153. Moore FC and Lobell DB. The fingerprint of climate trends on European crop
yields. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2015; 112: 2670–5.
154. Peng S, Huang J and Sheehy JE et al. Rice yields decline with higher
night temperature from global warming. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2004; 101:
9971–5.
155. Schlenker W and Lobell DB. Robust negative impacts of climate change on
African agriculture. Environ Res Lett 2010; 5: 014010.
156. Schlenker W and Roberts MJ. Nonlinear temperature effects indicate severe
damages to U.S. crop yields under climate change. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA
2009; 106: 15594–8.
157. Ban K. A Climate Culprit In Darfur. The Washington Post, June 2007.
158. Burke MB, Miguel E and Satyanath S et al.Warming increases the risk of civil
war in Africa. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2009; 106: 20670–4.
159. Hsiang SM, Meng KC and Cane MA. Civil conflicts are associated with the
global climate. Nature 2011; 476: 438–41.
160. Hsiang SM, Burke M and Miguel E. Quantifying the influence of climate on
human conflict. Science 2013; 341: 1235367.
161. Kelley CP, Mohtadi S and Cane MA et al. Climate change in the Fertile Cres-
cent and implications of the recent Syrian drought. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA
2015; 112: 3241–6.
162. Barbieri AF, Domingues E and Queiroz BL et al. Climate change and population
migration in Brazil’s Northeast: scenarios for 2025-2050. Popul Environ 2010;
31: 344–70.
163. Feng S, Krueger AB and Oppenheimer M. Linkages among climate change,
crop yields and Mexico-US cross-border migration. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA
2010; 107: 14257–62.
164. Myers N. Environmental refugees: a growing phenomenon of the 21st century.
Philos Trans Royal Soc 2002; 357: 609–13.
165. Houghton JT, Callander BA and Varney SK. Climate change 1992: the supple-
mentary report to the IPCC scientific assessment. Cambridge University Press,
1992.
166. IPCC. Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis. Contribution of Working
Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
167. IPCC. Climate change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution ofWorking Groups
I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change. Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC, 2007.
168. Stern N. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. New York,
USA: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
169. Ruiz GM, Rawlings TK and Dobbs FC et al. Global spread of microorganisms
by ships. Nature 2000; 408: 49–50.
170. Liu J, Dietz T and Carpenter SR et al. Complexity of coupled human and natural
systems. Science 2007; 317: 1513–6.
171. Manabe S, Smagorinsky J and Strickler RF. Simulated climatology of a gen-
eral circulation model with a hydrologic cycle. Mon Weather Rev 1965; 93:
769–98.
172. Zebiak SE and Cane MA. A model El Nin˜o-Southern oscillation.MonWeather
Rev 1987; 115: 2262–78.
173. Cane MA, Zebiak SE and Dolan SC. Experimental forecasts of El Nin˜o. Nature
1986; 321: 827–32.
174. Koster RD, Guo Z and Yang R et al. On the nature of soil moisture in land
surface models. J Clim 2009; 22: 4322–35.
175. Calvin K, Wise M and Clarke L et al. Implications of simultaneously mitigating
and adapting to climate change: initial experiments using GCAM. Clim Change
2013; 117: 545–60.
176. Edmonds JE, Wise MA and MacCracken CN. Advanced energy technologies
and climate change: An analysis using the global change assessment model
(GCAM). Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei, 1994.
177. MNP. Integrated Modelling of Global Environmental Change. An Overview of
IMAGE 2.4. Bilthoven, the Netherlands: Netherlands Environmental Assess-
ment Agency (MNP), 2006.
178. Nakicenovic N and Riahi K. Model runs with MESSAGE in the Context of the
Further Development of the Kyoto-Protocol. FINAL REPORT submitted to the
Secretariat of the German Advisory Council on Global Change Contract Nr.
WBGU II/2003; IIASA Contract No. 03-116, International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria, 2003.
179. Prinn R, Jacoby H and Sokolov A et al. Integrated global system model for
climate policy assessment: feedbacks and sensitivity studies. Clim Change
1999; 41: 469–546.
180. Sokolov AP, Schlosser CA and Dutkiewicz S et al.MIT integrated global sys-
temmodel (IGSM) version 2: model description and baseline evaluation. Tech-
nical report. MIT 2005.
181. Nobre C, Brasseur GP and Shapiro MA et al. Addressing the complexity of the
Earth System. Bull Am Meteorol Soc 2010; 91: 1389–96.
182. Cohen JE. Make secondary education universal. Nature 2008; 456: 572–3.
183. Potts M and Marsh L. The population factor: How does it relate to climate
change. Clim Adapt 2010.
184. Sulston J, Bateson P and Biggar N et al. People and the planet. Technical
Report 01/12. The Royal Society Science Policy Centre 2012.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/nsr/article-abstract/3/4/470/2669331 by U
niversity of N
ew
castle user on 11 Septem
ber 2018
492 Natl Sci Rev, 2016, Vol. 3, No. 4 REVIEW
185. NASA. Earth System Science: A Closer View. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Washington, DC, 1988.
186. Hannon B and Ruth M. Dynamic Modeling of Diseases and Pests. Springer,
2009.
187. Hannon B and RuthM.Modeling Dynamic Biological Systems. Springer, 2014.
188. RuthMand Davidsdottir B. Changing Stocks, Flows and Behaviors in Industrial
Ecosystems. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publish-
ing, 2009.
189. Ruth M and Hannon B. Modeling Dynamic Economic Systems, 2nd edn.
New York: Springer, 2012.
190. Costanza R and Ruth M. Using dynamic modeling to scope environmental
problems and build consensus. Environ Manag 1998; 22: 183–95.
191. Hannon BM and Ruth M. Dynamic Modeling, 1st edn. Berlin, New York:
Springer, 1994.
192. Meadows DH. Thinking in Systems: A Primer. White River Junction, VT, USA:
Chelsea Green Publishing, 2008.
193. Sterman J, Fiddaman T and Franck T et al. Climate interactive: the C-ROADS
climate policy model. Syst Dynamics Rev 2012; 28: 295–305.
194. Anderson JL. An ensemble adjustment Kalman filter for Data Assimilation.
Mon Weather Rev 2001; 129: 2884–903.
195. Hunt BR, Kostelich EJ and Szunyogh I. Efficient data assimilation for spa-
tiotemporal chaos: a local ensemble transform Kalman filter. Physica D 2007;
230: 112–26.
196. Kalnay E. Atmospheric Modeling, Data Assimilation and Predictability. Cam-
bridge University Press, first edition, 2003.
197. Lorenc AC. The potential of the ensemble Kalman filter for NWP—a compar-
ison with 4D-Var. Q J R Meteorol Soc 2003; 129: 3183–203.
198. Whitaker JS and Hamill TM. Ensemble Data Assimilation without perturbed
observations.Mon Weather Rev 2002; 130: 1913–24.
199. Annan JD and Hargreaves JC. Efficient parameter estimation for a highly
chaotic system. Tellus A 2004; 56: 520–6.
200. Annan JD, Lunt DJ and Hargreaves JC et al. Parameter estimation in an atmo-
spheric GCM using the Ensemble Kalman Filter.Nonlinear Processes Geophys
2005; 12: 363–71.
201. Evensen G. The ensemble Kalman filter for combined state and parameter
estimation. IEEE Control Sys 2009; 29: 83–104.
202. Kang JS, Kalnay E and Liu J et al. “Variable localization” in an ensemble
Kalman filter: application to the carbon cycle data assimilation. J Geophys
Res 2011; 116: D09110.
203. Kang JS, Kalnay E and Miyoshi T et al. Estimation of surface carbon fluxes
with an advanced data assimilation methodology. J Geophys Res 2012; 117:
D24101.
204. Liu Y, Liu Z and Zhang S et al. Ensemble-based parameter estimation in a
coupled general circulation model. J Clim 2014; 27: 7151–62.
205. Liu Y, Liu Z and Zhang S et al. Ensemble-based parameter estimation in a
coupled GCM using the adaptive spatial average method. J Clim 2014; 27:
4002–14.
206. Ruiz JJ, Pulido M and Miyoshi T. Estimating model parameters with
ensemble-based data assimilation: a review. J Meteorol Soc Japan Ser II
2013; 91: 79–99.
207. Buizza R, Tribbia J and Molteni F et al. Computation of optimal unstable struc-
tures for a numerical weather prediction model. Tellus A 1993; 45: 388–407.
208. Buizza R, Milleer M and Palmer T. Stochastic representation of model uncer-
tainties in the ECMWF ensemble prediction system. Q J RMeteorol Soc 1999;
125: 2887–908.
209. Toth Z and Kalnay E. Ensemble forecasting at NMC: the generation of pertur-
bations. Bull Am Meteorol Soc 1993; 74: 2317–30.
210. Tracton MS and Kalnay E. Operational ensemble prediction at the National
Meteorological Center: practical aspects.Weather Forecast 1993; 8: 379–98.
211. Lenton TM, Held H and Kriegler E et al. Tipping elements in the Earth’s climate
system. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2008; 105: 1786–93.
212. Nobre CA and Borma LDS. ‘Tipping points’ for the Amazon forest. Curr Opin
Environ Sustain 2009; 1: 28–36.
213. Schellnhuber HJ. Tipping elements in the Earth System. Proc Natl Acad Sci
USA 2009; 106: 20561–3.
214. Downey SS, Haas WR and Shennan SJ. European Neolithic societies showed
early warning signals of population collapse. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2016;
113: 9751–6.
215. Ruth M, Kalnay E and Zeng N et al. Sustainable prosperity and societal tran-
sitions: long-term modeling for anticipatory management. Environ Innov Soc
Trans 2011; 1: 160–5.
216. Scheffer M and Carpenter SR. Catastrophic regime shifts in ecosystems: link-
ing theory to observation. Trends Ecol Evol 2003; 18: 648–56.
217. Scheffer M, Carpenter S and Foley JA et al. Catastrophic shifts in ecosystems.
Nature 2001; 413: 591–6.
218. Brundtland GH, Ehrlich P and Goldemberg J et al. Environment and develop-
ment challenges: the imperative to act. Technical report. Barefoot College,
Conservation International, International institute for Environment and Devel-
opment, and International Union for the Conservation of Nature 2012.
219. Ruth M. Economic and social benefits of climate information: assessing the
cost of inaction. Procedia Environ Sci 2010; 1: 387–394.
220. Boden TA, Marland G and Andres RJ. Global, regional, and national fossil fuel
CO2 emissions. Technical report. Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory US Department of Energy 2013.
221. NAS. The Growth of World Population: Analysis of the Problems and Recom-
mendations for Research and Training. National Academy of Sciences, Com-
mittee on Science and Public Policy. Washington, D.C.: National Academies
Press, 1963.
222. NAS. Rapid Population Growth: Consequences and Policy Implications. Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, Office of the Foreign Secretary. Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, for the National Academy of Sciences, 1971.
223. NAS. Population Growth and Economic Development: Policy Questions. Na-
tional Academies of Sciences, Engineering, andMedicine, Committee on Pop-
ulation, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, National
Research Council. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 1986.
224. NAS. Population and Land Use in Developing Countries: Report of a Work-
shop. National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Population, Division of
Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, National Research Council.
Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 1993.
225. NAS. Critical Perspectives on Schooling and Fertility in the DevelopingWorld.
National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Population, Division of Behav-
ioral and Social Sciences and Education, National Research Council. Wash-
ington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 1999.
226. NAS and Royal Society. The Royal Society and the National Academy of Sci-
ences on population growth and sustainability: population growth, resource
consumption, and a sustainable world. Popul Dev Rev 1992; 18: 375–8.
227. Turner A. Population priorities: the challenge of continued rapid population
growth. Philos Trans Royal Soc 2009; 364: 2977–84.
228. Bolt J and van Zanden JL. The Maddison Project: collaborative research on
historical national accounts. Econ Hist Rev 2014; 67: 627–51.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/nsr/article-abstract/3/4/470/2669331 by U
niversity of N
ew
castle user on 11 Septem
ber 2018
REVIEW Motesharrei et al. 493
229. Maddison A. The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Paris: Develop-
ment Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
2001.
230. United Nations.World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, DVD Edition.
Working Paper ESA/P/WP.228. United Nations, Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, Population Division, 2013.
231. Bruckner M, Giljum S and Lutz C et al. Materials embodied in international
trade – global material extraction and consumption between 1995 and 2005.
Glob Environ Change 2012; 22: 568–76.
232. Mun˜oz P, Giljum S and Roca J. The RawMaterial Equivalents of International
Trade. Journal of Industrial Ecology 2009; 13: 881–97.
233. Wiedmann TO, Schandl H and Lenzen M et al. The material footprint of na-
tions. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2015; 112: 6271–6.
234. Ruth M. Information, order and knowledge in economic and ecological sys-
tems: implications for material and energy use. Ecol Econ 1995; 13: 99–114.
235. Ruth M. Thermodynamic constraints on optimal depletion of copper and alu-
minum in the United States: a dynamic model of substitution and technical
change. Ecol Econ 1995; 15: 197–213.
236. Turral H, Svendsen M and Faures JM. Investing in irrigation: reviewing the
past and looking to the future. Agric Water Manag 2010; 97: 551–60.
237. Kendall HW and Pimentel D. Constraints on the expansion of the global food
supply. Ambio 1994; 198–205.
238. Ramankutty N, Foley JA and Olejniczak NJ. People on the land: changes in
global population and croplands during the 20th century. AMBIO 2002; 31:
251–7.
239. Cleveland CJ and Ruth M. Indicators of dematerialization and the materials
intensity of use. J Indu Ecol 1998; 2: 15–50.
240. Seppelt R,Manceur AMand Liu J et al. Synchronized peak-rate years of global
resources use. Ecol Soc 2014; 19: 50.
241. Tripati AK, Roberts CD and Eagle RA. Coupling of CO2 and ice sheet stability
over major climate transitions of the last 20 million years. Science 2009; 326:
1394–7.
242. Bierregaard RO, Lovejoy TE and Kapos V et al. The biological dynamics of
tropical rainforest fragments. BioScience 1992; 42: 859–66.
243. Ferraz G, Russell GJ and Stouffer PC et al. Rates of species loss from Amazo-
nian forest fragments. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2003; 100: 14069–73.
244. Gibson L, LynamAJ and Bradshaw JA et al.Near-complete extinction of native
small mammal fauna 25 years after forest fragmentation. Science 2013; 341:
1508–10.
245. Hanski I, Zurita GA and Bellocq MI et al. Species–fragmented area relation-
ship. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2013; 110: 12715–20.
246. Laurance WF. Rapid land-use change and its impacts on tropical biodiversity.
In: Defries RS, Asner GP and Houghton RA (eds). Ecosystems and Land Use
Change. American Geophysical Union, 2004, 189–99.
247. Laurance WF, Laurance SG and Ferreira LV et al. Biomass collapse in Amazo-
nian Forest fragments. Science 1997; 278: 1117–8.
248. Laurance WF, Vasconcelos HL and Lovejoy TE. Forest loss and fragmentation
in the Amazon: implications for wildlife conservation. Oryx 2000; 34: 39–45.
249. Laurance WF, Lovejoy TE and Vasconcelos HL et al. Ecosystem decay of Ama-
zonian Forest fragments: a 22-year investigation. Conservation Biology 2002;
16: 605–18.
250. Lewis SL, Edwards DP and Galbraith D. Increasing human dominance of trop-
ical forests. Science 2015; 349: 827–32.
251. Powell LL, Zurita G and Wolfe JD et al. Changes in habitat use at rain forest
edges through succession: a case study of understory birds in the Brazilian
Amazon. Biotropica 2015; 47: 723–32.
252. WWF. Living Planet Report 2016. Risk and resilience in a new era. Gland,
Switzerland: World Wildlife Fund International, 2016.
253. Abel GJ and Sander N. Quantifying Global International Migration Flows. Sci-
ence 2014; 343: 1520–2.
254. UNHCR. Global trends: forced displacement in 2015. Technical report. United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2016.
255. DESTATIS. Annual Report 2015. Technical report. Federal Statistical Office of
Germany 2016.
256. United Nations. The World at Six Billion. Working Paper ESA/P/WP.154.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Di-
vision, 1999.
257. United Nations. World Population to 2300. Working Paper
ST/ESA/SER.A/236. United Nations, Department of Economic and So-
cial Affairs, Population Division, 2004.
258. Lesthaeghe R. The fertility transition in Sub-Saharan Africa into the 21st
century. Technical Report. Population Studies Center, University of Michigan
2014.
259. NAS. The Determinants of Recent Trends in Fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa:
A Workshop Summary. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and
Medicine, Committee on Population, Division of Behavioral and Social Sci-
ences and Education. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2016.
260. World Bank Group. Turn down the heat: confronting the new climate normal.
Technical report. World Bank 2014.
261. Iyer GC, Edmonds JA and Fawcett AA et al. The contribution of Paris to limit
global warming to 2◦C. Environ Res Lett 2015; 10: 125002.
262. Fawcett AA, Iyer GC and Clarke LE et al. Can Paris pledges avert severe cli-
mate change? Science 2015; 350: 1168–9.
263. Co´zar A, Echevarrı´a F and Gonza´lez-Gordillo JI et al. Plastic debris in the open
ocean. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2014; 111: 10239–44.
264. Jambeck JR, Geyer R and Wilcox C et al. Plastic waste inputs from land into
the ocean. Science 2015; 347: 768–71.
265. ReesWE. Revisiting carrying capacity: area-based indicators of sustainability.
Popul Environ 1996; 17: 195–215.
266. Wu¨rtenberger L, Koellner T and Binder CR. Virtual land use and agricultural
trade: estimating environmental and socio-economic impacts. Ecol Econ 2006;
57: 679–97.
267. Bazilian M, Rogner H and Howells M et al. Considering the energy, water and
food nexus: towards an integrated modelling approach. Energy Policy 2011;
39: 7896–906.
268. Dale VH, Efroymson RA and Kline KL. The land use–climate change–energy
nexus. Landsc Ecol 2011; 26: 755–73.
269. Hussey K and Pittock J. The energy-water Nexus: managing the links between
energy and water for a sustainable future. Ecol Soc 2012; 17.
270. Khan S and Hanjra MA. Footprints of water and energy inputs in food
production—Global perspectives. Food Policy 2009; 34: 130–40.
271. Waughray D.Water Security: The Water-Food-Energy-Climate Nexus. Wash-
ington, DC, USA: Island Press, 2011.
272. Shennan S, Downey SS and Timpson A et al. Regional population collapse fol-
lowed initial agriculture booms in mid-Holocene Europe. Nat Commun 2013;
4: 2486.
273. Kuchment A. Drilling for Earthquakes. Scientific American, 2016.
274. Melillo JM, Richmond TTC and Yohe GW. Climate Change Impacts in the
United States: The Third National Climate Assessment. Washington, DC: US
Global Change Research Program, 2014.
275. Costanza R, Kubiszewski I and Giovannini E et al. Development: time to leave
GDP behind. Nature 2014; 505: 283–5.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/nsr/article-abstract/3/4/470/2669331 by U
niversity of N
ew
castle user on 11 Septem
ber 2018
494 Natl Sci Rev, 2016, Vol. 3, No. 4 REVIEW
276. Anand S and Sen A. Human Development Index: Methodology and Measure-
ment. Human Development Occasional Papers (1992-2007) HDOCPA-1994-02,
Human Development Report Office (HDRO), United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP), 1994.
277. Talberth J, Cobb C and Slattery N. The genuine progress indicator 2006. Tech-
nical report. 2007.
278. Van de Kerk G and Manuel AR. A comprehensive index for a sustainable so-
ciety: The SSI — the Sustainable Society Index. Ecol Econ 2008; 66: 228–42.
279. Miller RE and Blair PD. Input-Output Analysis: Foundations and Extensions.
New York, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
280. Murray J and Wood R. The Sustainability Practitioner’s Guide to Input-output
Analysis. Champaign, IL, USA: Common Ground Pub., 2010.
281. Hendrickson C, Horvath A and Joshi S et al. Peer reviewed: economic input-
o models for environmental life-c assessment. Environ Sci Technol 1998; 32:
184A–191A.
282. Hubacek K, Feng K and Minx JC et al. Teleconnecting consumption to envi-
ronmental impacts at multiple spatial scales. J Ind Ecol 2014; 18: 7–9.
283. Lenzen M, Moran D and Kanemoto K et al. International trade drives biodiver-
sity threats in developing nations. Nature 2012; 486: 109–12.
284. Feng K, Hubacek K and Minx J et al. Spatially explicit analysis of water foot-
prints in the UK.Water 2011; 3: 47–63.
285. Guan D and Hubacek K. Assessment of regional trade and virtual water flows
in China. Ecological Economics 2007; 61: 159–70.
286. Guan D and Hubacek K. A new and integrated hydro-economic accounting
and analytical framework for water resources: a case study for North China.
J Environ Manag 2008; 88: 1300–13.
287. Feng K, Hubacek K and Guan D et al. Distributional effects of climate change
taxation: the case of the UK. Environ Sci Technol 2010; 44: 3670–6.
288. Guan D, Peters GP and Weber CL et al. Journey to world top emitter: an anal-
ysis of the driving forces of China’s recent CO2 emissions surge. Geophys Res
Lett 2009; 36: L04709.
289. Hertwich EG and Peters GP. Carbon footprint of nations: a global, trade-linked
analysis. Environ Sci Technol 2009; 43: 6414–20.
290. Hubacek K and Sun L. A scenario analysis of China’s land use and land
cover change: incorporating biophysical information into input-output mod-
eling. Struct Change Econ Dynamics 2001; 12: 367–97.
291. Weinzettel J, Hertwich EG and Peters GP et al. Affluence drives the global
displacement of land use. Glob Environ Change 2013; 23: 433–8.
292. Barrett J, Peters G and Wiedmann T et al. Consumption-based GHG emission
accounting: a UK case study. Climate Policy 2013; 13: 451–70.
293. Feng K, Siu YL and Guan D et al. Analyzing drivers of regional carbon dioxide
emissions for China. J Ind Ecol 2012; 16: 600–11.
294. Guan D, Hubacek K andWeber CL et al. The drivers of Chinese CO2 emissions
from 1980 to 2030. Glob Environ Change 2008; 18: 626–34.
295. Baiocchi G, Minx J and Hubacek K. The impact of social factors and consumer
behavior on carbon dioxide emissions in the United Kingdom. J Ind Ecol 2010;
14: 50–72.
296. Duchin F. The Future of the Environment: Ecological Economics and Techno-
logical Change. New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 1994.
297. Srebric J, Heidarinejad M and Liu J. Building neighborhood emerging proper-
ties and their impacts onmulti-scale modeling of building energy and airflows.
Build Environ 2015; 91: 246–62.
298. Izquierdo AE, Angelo CD and Aide TM. Thirty years of human demography and
land-use change in the Atlantic Forest of Misiones, Argentina: an evaluation
of the Forest Transition Model. Ecol Soc 2008; 13.
299. Jeffrey R. Politics, Women and Well-being: How Kerala Became “a Model”.
Macmillan Press Houndsmills, 1992.
300. Singh P. We-ness and welfare: a longitudinal analysis of social development
in Kerala, India.World Dev 2011; 39: 282–93.
301. Susuman AS, Lougue S and Battala M. Female literacy, fertility decline and
life expectancy in Kerala, India: an analysis from Census of India 2011. J Asian
Afr Stud 2016; 51: 32–42. Published online before print on July 14, 2014.
302. Lutz W and Samir Kc. Global human capital: integrating education and popu-
lation. Science 2011; 333: 587–92.
303. La Ferrara E, Chong A and Duryea S. Soap operas and fertility: evidence from
Brazil. Am Econ J 2012; 4: 1–31.
304. Abbasi-Shavazi MJ, McDonald P and Hosseini-Chavoshi M. The Fertility Tran-
sition in Iran: Revolution and Reproduction. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer,
2009.
305. Lutz W, Cuaresma JC and Abbasi-Shavazi MJ. Demography, education, and
democracy: global trends and the case of Iran. Popul Dev Rev 2010; 36:
253–81.
306. Pritchett LH. Desired fertility and the impact of population policies. Popul Dev
Rev 1994; 20: 1–55.
307. Roudi-Fahimi F. Iran’s Family Planning Program: Responding to a Nation’s
Needs. Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, 2002.
308. Vahidnia F. Case study: fertility decline in Iran. Popul Environ 2007; 28:
259–66.
309. O’Neill BC, Dalton M and Fuchs R et al. Global demographic trends and future
carbon emissions. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2010; 107: 17521–6.
310. Wire T. Fewer emitters, lower emissions, less cost: reducing future carbon
emissions by investing in family planning. Technical report. London School of
Economics 2009.
311. Hilboll A, Richter A and Burrows JP. Long-term changes of tropospheric NO2
overmegacities derived frommultiple satellite instruments.Atmos Chem Phys
2013; 13: 4145–69.
312. He H, Vinnikov KY and Li C et al. Response of SO2 and particulate air pollution
to local and regional emission controls: a case study inMaryland. Earth Future
2016; 4: 2015EF000330.
313. Krotkov NA, McLinden CA and Li C et al. Aura OMI observations of regional
SO2 and NO2 pollution changes from 2005 to 2015. Atmos Chem Phys 2016;
16: 4605–29.
314. Budyko MI. The heat balance of the Earth’s Surface. Sov Geogr 1961; 2: 3–13.
315. Manabe S and Wetherald RT. Thermal equilibrium of the atmosphere with a
given distribution of relative humidity. J Atmos Sci 1967; 24: 241–59.
316. Matthews WH, Kellogg WW and Robinson G. Man’s Impact on the Climate.
Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1971.
317. Charney JG, Arakawa A and Baker DJ et al. Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A
Scientific Assessment.Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1979.
Report of an Ad Hoc Study Group on Carbon Dioxide and Climate,Woods Hole,
Massachusetts, July 23-27, 1979 to the Climate Research Board, Assembly of
Mathematical and Physical Sciences, National Research Council.
318. IPCC. Climate Change 2014: synthesis report. In: Core writing team Pachauri
RK and Meyer LA (eds). Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Geneva, Switzerland: 2014.
319. Barnett J. Security and climate change. Glob Environ Change 2003; 13: 7–17.
320. Brown N. Climate, ecology and international security. Survival 1989; 31: 519–
32.
321. Sagdeev RZ and Eisenhower S. The global warming problem: a vital concern
for global security. In: Minger TJ (ed.). Greenhouse Glasnost: The Crisis of
Global Warming, 1st edn. New York; Salt Lake City, UT: Ecco Press, 1990,
261–68.
322. Kintisch E. After Paris: the rocky road ahead. Science 2015; 350: 1018–9.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/nsr/article-abstract/3/4/470/2669331 by U
niversity of N
ew
castle user on 11 Septem
ber 2018
